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The Effects of Regulatory Threats and Strategic Bargaining
on Firms' Voluntary Participation in Pollution Reduction Programs
by: Claire M. Jahns

Introduction

After years of intense debate, global climate change has finally been acknowledged as a
serious threat to global biological, political and economic systems. There is overwhelming evidence
that the atmospheric wanning observed over the course of the past 50 years, as well as the
increasing incidence of extreme weather events and floods, is being caused by the acceleration of
the rate in which greenhouse gases (GRGs) produced by the burning of fossil fuels are being
released into the atmosphere (IPCC: 2001). The extreme weather and weather-related events
associated with climate change, such as landslides and flooding, totaled roughly $40 billion in the
1990s (IPCC: 200l-b, 13). It is not surprising, then, that the governments of many developed and
developing nations, as well as intergovernmental bodies like the United Nations and the World
Bank, have adopted a variety of measures to reduce GRG emissions and mitigate the potential
impacts of climatic change. The government of Slovakia sold credits for 200,000 metric tons of
carbon dioxide equivalents to a Japanese trading house at an undisclosed price on December 6,
2002, making history by signing the first deal to be officially credited within the international
Kyoto Protocol, a global agreement to reduce the GRG emissions of participating countries seven
percent relative to their 1990 levels by 2010 (Gardner: 2002). Nor is it surprising that
environmental interest groups and active citizens in the United States and elsewhere are pressing
their elected leaders to pass stricter regulations on the emission of GRGs.
What is somewhat baffling, though, is the number of privately owned companies that have
taken it upon themselves to voluntarily reduce GRG emissions as a way to address climate change
in recent years. Dozens of companies are voluntarily participating in the design and
implementation of GRG emission reductions programs.) For example, the International Emissions
Trading Association (lETA) lists 47 international members including Gaz de France, British
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Petroleum, Shell International Limited, Norsk Hydro and Unocal.2 Private for-profit groups like
the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), a pilot emissions reduction credit (ERC) trading program,
and C02e.com, Cantor Fitzgerald's online emission trading market, are forming partnerships with
private companies to devise strategies for reducing emissions in the quickest and most costeffective manner. Government programs like the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Trading
Pilot (GERT) in Canada and other programs in France and the United Kingdom are forming
similar partnerships. Nonprofit environmental groups like Environmental Defense and the World
Wildlife Fund have their own, similar pilot projects. Most of these voluntary programs are centered
around emissions trading, a policy tool commonly utilized for its cost effectiveness and ability to
yield abatement results.
It is unexpected for a firm to voluntarily reorganize its operations, design and implement

new policies and practices, retrain existing staff or hire new staff or purchase pollution-control
devices because such actions impose additional costs on the firm if mandatory pollution-control
legislation does not exist (Welch et. al.: 2002). A stable climate is a public good: it is nonexcludable, and is therefore able to be used or abused by anyone. The expenditures of private
firms, on the other hand, are usually made to produce goods that are sold and bought for private
profit. Pollution, the inevitable byproduct of business, is known as a negative pecuniary externality

in economic terms, meaning that it has negative effects on a third party, i.e., society at large, that are
not fully accounted for in the price of the company's product. Environmental regulation is enacted
to protect public goods like air and water by reducing the incidence of negative externalities with
taxes, fees, technological requirements and other measures designed to force a firm to internalize
the social costs of production. A company whose actions fall under the jurisdiction of
governmental regulation must privately bear the costs of protecting public goods, although those
costs are passed on to consumers whenever possible. On the other hand, if laws regulating the
emission of carbon dioxide and other GHGs do not exist, as is presently the case in the United
States, then a company does not need to spend revenues on pollution control. Herein lies the heart
of this paper: why would a rational, profit-maximizing company voluntarily comply with, or help to
design, a program intended to impose limits on GHG emissions to avoid the public "bad" of
climate change? By doing so, a company is, theoretically, voluntarily internalizing some or all of
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the negative external costs associated with GHG pollution. In other words, the company is
imposing costs on itself to come into compliance with voluntary rules, and may even have to pay
enforcement penalties if the rules are not obeyed. From the standpoint of a cost-benefit analysis, an
unregulated firm must see some private benefit to these additional expenditures, unless the firm is
acting in a completely altruistic manner. Ruling out total altruism, the private benefits of voluntarily
reducing GHG emissions or participating in the design process of an emissions reduction policy or
program must outweigh the costs for those firms that choose to voluntarily take action.
This paper is an investigation into how the private benefits of engagement in GHG
abatement projects and qUalitative background elements are perceived by profit-maximizing firms,
and of how and why firms decide to voluntarily improve their environmental records and, therefore,
mitigate the impending threat of global climatic change. Particular attention is paid to the factors
that might prompt a firm to voluntarily reduce its emissions through participation in a model or
pilot GHG allowance or credit trading system like GERT, C02e.com or the CCX. Chapter One
explains the theoretical underpinnings of general voluntary participation as they apply to individual
firms, with supporting evidence from the emerging participation in GHG abatement programs.
This section of the paper presents the hypothesis that a rising threat of mandatory regulation
affects firms' perceptions of the costs and benefits of voluntary emissions reductions. The threat
of mandatory rules in the future manifests "new" benefits and changes the relative size of existing
benefits for frrms considering voluntary abatements. Chapter Two lays out the structure of a
voluntary chemical use and release mitigation program called the 33/50 Program (henceforth:
Program), which the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ran from 1991 to 1995, and
existing theoretical and empirical models of the strictly economic and fmancial factors that
contribute to a frrm's decision to participate in that Program. Next, Chapter Three presents and
describes an empirical model of state-level participation in the 33/50 Program that is used to
quantitatively examine the regulatory, political and economic factors that promote or discourage
voluntary participation. The empirical model examines how public sentiment and the relative
bargaining powers of private manufacturing industries within a state and public governmental
bodies work to affect participation rates among polluters in each state, as well as how economic
factors like unemployment rates, average manufacturing frrm size and the structure of a state's
economy impact Program participation rates. The results of the empirical model appear in Chapter
3

Four, as does the analysis of the model. In Chapter Five, lessons are drawn from the empirical
analysis to shed light on the current state of the GHG emissions abatement programs and trading
markets. The policy implications of the findings are discussed in Chapter Five, and specific
recommendations made as to how to promote participation in voluntary GHG abatement programs.
The empirical evidence, together with the underlying political-economic theories, suggest that the
threat of impending mandatory regulation can make voluntary participation seem increasingly
desirable to firms, but that actually attempting to impose those laws would force the regulator into a
strategic bargaining game with finns. Rather than enter into this game, which must be played to
induce some firms to install equipment for compliance that costs more than the penalties under a
command-and-control regime, the costs of compliance, either voluntary or mandatory, can be
lowered significantly by instituting an emissions permit trading system. By providing incentives
for compliance rather than disincentives for noncompliance, smart policy-makers can promote
emissions reductions at the lowest possible cost to firms and society.

4

Chapter One
The Theoretical Underpinnings of Voluntary Participation

There is a sizable body of theoretical and empirical literature that studies fIrms' motives for
voluntary participation in programs that yield environmental and social benefIts. A fIrm must gauge
the costs and benefIts of voluntary compliance before it makes the participation decision. A
number of economists, including Aseem Prakash, SeemaArora and Timothy Cason and Robert
Baylis, Lianne Connell and Andrew Flynn cite a variety of categories of costs and benefIts of
voluntary compliance with environmental programs. The biggest potential costs could come from
new capital equipment, employee retraining, fInancial market fluctuations and, of course, the
opportunity costs of the funds used for development of and compliance with voluntary programs.
Potential benefIts include savings realized from enhanced operating efficiency, goodwill from
shareholders, consumers, and other concerned communities and preempting mandatory regulation
and thereby getting a jump on competitors. The magnitude of potential costs and benefIts are
primarily determined by two things: the level of the threat of mandatory regulation a company
believes to exist and the type of voluntary program being implemented. Certain benefIts and costs
change in size depending on these two variables. Therefore, in order to get a better handle on
theories behind voluntary pollution mitigation and GHG abatement in particular, this paper begins
with an explanation of the background level of regulatory threat perceived by relevant fIrms and
then explains how emissions trading systems work and why they are the most likely candidates for
policy tools if mandatory emissions abatement legislation is adopted in the United States. With the
political background in place, the potential benefIts and costs of voluntary participation in pollution
abatement programs can be discussed. Each of these topics has its own section below.

The Threat of Legislation

Regulation of GHGs in the name of climate ch~ge i~ a relatively new policy area, but it is
also a fast-growing one. The Kyoto treaty requires each participating country to devise its own
emission reductions strategies in order to reach compliance with the global abatement agreements.
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Sixteen nations have either mandatory or voluntary GHGs reduction programs, and some, like the
Netherlands and Canada, have more than one program in operation. In addition to these domestic
programs, the European Union, the World Bank and North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) countries are developing their own abatement policies and programs.3 Roughly 5,000
companies face emissions controUegislation from the Eur9pean Union (Fialka: 2002) .
.Given the evolution of GHG emissions control policy in the past decade, it seems
reasonable to conclude that domestic and international policy could be drivers behind many fIrms'
decisions to voluntarily reduce emissions of GHGs. Indeed, this hypothesis is supported by
evidence from the investment industry as well as groups that are trying to establish voluntary
trading programs in carbon equivalent credits, like the CCX, and theoretical literature. According to
John S. Guttmann, a commercial environmental attorney, companies that stand to be affected by
environmental regulation, "are always on the lookout for trends that will be of importance to the
regulated community, regulators, and the public" because those changes tend to lead to
environmental regulation (Guttmann: 1998,82). Guttmann notes that globalization and public
participation in the regulatory process are two recent trends pushing environmental policy. Massive
globalized manufacturing corporations will playa critical role in international GHG abatement
schemes, and publicly available documents like the U.S. EPA's 1990-2000 Inventory of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks empower citizens to question corporations' environmental
policies (or lack thereof). Citizen and other stakeholders' action will be discussed toward the end
of this chapter, but it should be noted now that people who believe themselves to be stakeholders in
a corporation in one way or another significantly push companies to improve their environmental
records (Foulon et. at.: 2001; Prakash: 2002; Henningsen: 2002; Knoepfel: 2001).
Cantor Fitzgerald's satellite group dedicated to carbon trading, C02e.com, reports that
companies are already engaging in market transactions of carbon credits, and will do so·even more
in the future as a way to hedge their exposure to expected regulations and mandatory abatement of
GHG emissions. 4 PriceWaterhouseCoopers provides the consulting services to C02e.com's
customers through Climate Change Strategic Services, a specialized advisory service. The Service
provides companies with background scientific, political and regulatory analysis that helps
customers devise strategies to rriax~ze profItability in an uncertain future business environment.
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Climate Change Strategic Services emphasizes, "testing the business plan for climate change
impact," and operates under the assumption that, in the future, companies will have to operate, "in a
carbon constrained world."s According to a study by the World Bank and a New York-based
energy and environmental consulting and trading ftnn called Natsource LLC, carbon trading is
estimated to have quadrupled in 2002 compared to 2001. The World Bank estimates that between
$350 and $500 million in carbon dioxide emissions trades have taken place since 1996 (Fialka:
2002). Jack Cogen, the president of Natsource, is quoted in a Wall Street Journal article as saying,
"'If you're a company and you're looking toward the future, you may see a large liability

looming'" (Fialka: 2002). The liability is in reference to international and domestic (non-U.S.)
GHG regulatory systems that are supposed to go online within the next few years. This feeling is
echoed by Mike Walsh, senior vice president of Environmental Financial Products LLC, the ftnn
organizing the CCX. Walsh says, "there's a one-hundred percent probability of policy [change].
It's a matter of when" the regulations will be imposed (Walsh: 10/24/02). The Exchange
announced its fourteen founding members in January of 2003. 6
Even members of the petroleum industry - the industry that provides fuel to millions of
polluting internal combustion engines around the world - believe that regulation of GHGs,
particularly the GHGs in fossil fuels, is soon to be a fact of life. Lord John Browne, the CEO of
BP, believe's the U.S. government will regulate GHGs in the near future in spite of President
Bush's refusal to sign the Kyoto treaty. Moreover, Browne, like a number of other corporate
leaders and business analysts, believes companies that pre-empt mandatory regulation by
voluntarily mitigating harmful atmospheric impacts will not only gain competitive industry
advantage, but will also "'gain a seat at the table, a chance to influence the rules'" (Frey: 2002).
Kathleen Segerson and Thomas J. Miceli study the role that background regulatory threats
play in inducing fums to participate in theoretical, generic voluntary pollution reduction programs
in their paper, "Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental
Protection?" They look at how different theoretical scenarios for the relative bargaining powers of
a ftnn and a regulatory body affect voluntary pollution,aQatement outcomes. Neither the type of
pollution nor the type of voluntary program are specifted. They find that, in their model, a firm will
always accept a voluntary agreement if the possibility of legislation is greater than zero. They also
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find that, if the threat of regulation is high enough, the aggregate level of abatement will be higher
under a voluntary program than it would have been if an abatement level had been imposed
legislatively. Moreover, since compliance costs are lower under a voluntary program, a firm might
even accept a higher level of abatement than would have been agreed upon if the program were
mandatory. However, if the fum has all or most of the political bargaining power, then the level of
abatement reached under a voluntary agreement will be lower than the best possible level, i.e., the
maximum level of abatement that could have been reached voluntarily if the regulator had had the
majority of the bargaining power. For weak regulatory threats, the voluntary agreement would be
negotiated, but the level of abatement would not be as high as it would have been if the regulator
had more bargaining power (Segerson & Miceli: 1998, 128).
Segersonand Miceli also learn that, if the level of policy threat changes over time, the fum's
incentive to enter into a voluntary agreement will change as well. This means that the maximum
level of abatement a fum is willing to undertake will change as the probability of legislation changes
(Segerson & Miceli: 1998, 115). Their results indicate that voluntary actions which protect the
environment depend, among other things, on the relative level of regulatory threats, which in turn
depends on the political bargaining powers held by private (industrial) and public interests. The
results of their theoretical model have consequences in the public policy realm, and the empirical
model in this paper include independent variables that proxy for the relative bargaining powers of
private fums, the relevant regulatory body and the general public.

Emissions Trading Programs

Most of the policy tools that governments and international governing bodies like the
European Union have adopted for GHG abatement are centered around permit or emission
reduction credit (ERe) trading, in which agents are allowed to trade and bank permits to comply
with regulation. 7 Emissions trading harnesses market forces to reduce pollution in a cost-effective
and efficient manner. Trading is considered to be more flexible than command-and-control
environmental regulation because each fum is allowed to choose whether it reduces emissions
internally or buys emission reduction "credits" from other firms that have reduced emissions
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below the required level and therefore have excess credits to-either bank or sell. A rational ftrm will
choose the least-cost method of compliance with the emissions cap.
A successful example of such a program is Title N of the 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act
Amendments, which employs a cap-and-trade system to regulate emissions of sulfur dioxide (S02)
and nitrogen oxides (N0x). The Acid Rain Program, as Title N is known, has been deemed
successful by legislators and economists because of the significant reductions in S02 and NOx
emissions - 33 and 25 percent lower in 2001 than in 1990, respectively.s Even regulated utilities
prefer the market-based system over a command.,.and-control system because costs are relatively
low (Tietenberg: 2000; Stavins: 1995). The Kyoto Protocol employs an international permit and
offset trading system to help countries achieve compliance at the least possible cost. The majority
of countries participating in Kyoto that have already begun to design domestic compliance policies,
including Australia, Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom, plan on using mandatory or
voluntary internal emissions trading systems. 9

The Potential Benefits of Voluntmy Participation

The co~t effectiveness of trading schemes, and the high likelihood that future U.S.
regulation will employ a cap-and-trade system like the one used in the Acid Rain Program,
probably explains a good deal of firms' motivations for engaging in voluntary emissions trading
and the design of carbon markets. First, firms could potentially see large savings from improved
operating efftciency spurred by participation in a voluntary abatement program, particularly if that
program allows for ERCs to be sold on an exchange. There are at least three specific reasons why
a company would want to preempt future environmental regulation by voluntarily reducing harmful
environmental impacts: the ftrm could gain competitive advantage and ftrst-mover advantage in the
future; reductions now could be recognized under future regulation; and overseas industry pressure,
especially among multinationals and under the Kyoto Protocol, would be diffused. The economic
literature also gives at least four reasons for a companY'

to voluntarily reduce its emissions that do

not necessarily have to do with preempting mandatory regulation, but the results may be amplified
by participation in a voluntary program. Three of these beneftts are related to obtaining the
9

goodwill of a company's stakeholders, and one of which is, like enhanced operating efficiency, a
business strategy that tends to increase short- and long-term success for a variety of reasons. The
stakeholder benefits accrue from shareholder or investment market goodwill, consumer goodwill
and community goodwill. Each of these categories of benefits to voluntary action are outlined in
detail in the following paragraphs.

Improved Energy Efficiency

Basic economic theory states that a manufacturer (or any other economic agent) should try
to get the most output possible from a given amount of input - this is efficiency. Fuel to run the
production process is an input, and a profit-maximizing company will consume as little energy per
unit of good produced in its production processes as the relative costs of fossil fuels and their
substitutes dictate - this is energy efficiency. Despite the rationale, many firms operate below
maximum energy efficiency. Part of the problem is a lack of technical energy use expertise and the
absence of an aggressive strategy for reducing inefficiencies within the firm. Another obstacle is
the potentially high cost of energy-saving capital improvements. It might not make sense for a
company to upgrade all of its operations in one fiscal year, but it would be sensible for a forwardthinking firm to replace retired capital equipment with energy-efficient substitutes, because then the
"upgrade" would only be the marginal cost of the more efficient equipment, if the" more efficient
equipment is in fact more costly than other new equipment. Moreover, annual savings from
reduced energy use could be factored into the capital purchasing decision. The benefits of
improved energy efficiency would increase if regulation on carbon emissions were adopted - or if a

fum were to choose to join a voluntary emissions trading program, in which the firm could either
bank or sell accrued emission reduction credits. Every ton of carbon dioxide equivalent could be
applied toward compliance, and additional tons kept out of the air could be sold as ERCs. Under a
trading regime, a company can save money in its production processes and potentially generate
income by selling its excess ERCs to fums that cannot reach compliance.
Eventually, regulations on carbon emissions should bring the private costs of generating
emissions in line with the public costs, as that is the general goal of legislation aimed at
internalizing costs that are "external" to the fum. Various types of regulation, such as tax systems,
emissions caps and command-and-control, can be used to drive companies to internalize the
10

negative social externalities of their operations (Hobbs & Centolella: 1995). Finns that are said to
be going "beyond compliance" impose these or similar additional costs on themselves (Prakash:
2001). If a fInn that has been forced to internalize the GHG-related social costs associated with its
operations wishes to remain competitive, then reducing the amount of pollution produced per unit
of output can help a company achieve compliance and reduce overall operating costs. However, it
should be noted that a company may see a benefIt to joining an ERC trading system and registering
its current level of emissions before improving its operating efficiency and reducing emissions.
According to the theory of decreasing marginal returns to energy efficiency investments, the
marginally least expensive reductions will be the initial ones, so it would be wise to tie initial
effIciency-related abatements in with a trading program in order to receive ERCs for those relatively
"cheap" reductions. Receiving long-term bankable permits for baseline emissions reductions
might not be the best possible strategy for mitigating the threat of climate change, but it is a valid
motivation for a fIrm's voluntary participation.

Benefits Related to Potential Regulation:

Competitive Advantage in the Future & First-mover Advantage
It follows from the previous discussion of regulatory threat that preparation could be the

key to business success in an uncertain future. Adjusting policies and operations in anticipation of
regulatory shifts puts a fIrm at a competitive advantage in terms of being able to cost-effectively
cope with new new abatement demands. Mike Walsh of the CCX and others explain that those
fmns which already have the framework for reducing emissions in place, as well as trained staff,
will be better positioned to navigate the new regulatory fIeld than those fIrms that operate under the
mindset that business will always be business as usual.
Some companies set strict environmental performance standards and policies for themselves
as a form of business discipline. Electrolux, for example, sees the ultimate goal of "sustainability"
as "central to its business strategy and as a source of.;;ompetitive advantage" (Henningsen: 2002,
167). Thecommitment to sustainability sets Electrolux products apart from those of competitors,
"

and forces the company to take an active, involved role in its production process, which could help
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bring various inefficiencies to light. Similarly, BP CEO John Browne, possibly the most highprofIle example of corporate environmental leadership, sees investment in photovoltaic (PV)
production and the formation of symbiotic partnerships with local governments and nongovernmental organizations as investments that will serve the long-term interests of the company.
For example, BP is a participating member of the Environmental Defense's emission permit trading
group, among others, and has pledged $1 million to the Nature Conservancy of Canada for habitat
conservation. lO Browne sees increased demand for PV power in the future as energy markets are
deregulated, as energy provision becomes privatized, and as the U.S. government provides
additional incentives for consumers to use renewable power. Moreover, he thinks that subsidies
will someday be removed from fossil fuels (Lowe & Harris: 1998). Oil, natural gas and coal
companies are given billions of dollars annually in tax write-offs for exploration, developing and
drilling costs, and taxpayer funding for "clean coal" research and Export Import Bank guarantees
on investments in "unstable" countries. 11 Being prepared for changes in the political realm, he and
other business leaders reason, will serve the long-term competitive interests of the company.
Anticipating more stringent regulation could yield even greater returns if a company is
among the first in its industry to bring its operations in line with the expectations of future policies.
Aseem Prakash, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington in Seattle,
writes that there are two main reasons why pre-empting regulation would prove beneficial: it could
raise the cost of entry into the industry and put first-movers in a position to shape official public
policy (Prakash: 2002). According to some researchers, technologically advanced firms would be
the most likely to adopt green practices anyway, since they already have the infrastructure for
compliance in place. These firms could take further advantage of their position by pressuring the
rest of the industry to reduce environmental impacts, or by lobbying government to pass legislation
that would make certain "best available control" technologies - technologies monopolized by these
research-intensive firms -mandatory (Prakash: 2002). Firms that take leadership roles in their
respective industries are in a position to determine the course and nature of regulation; this goes for
firms that lead in the realm of environmental responsibility as well. Mike Walsh believes that the
government will soon begin to look for ways to regulate GHG emissions, and that the CCX will be
an obvious resource, since the Exchange will have already tested a domestic ERC trading system.
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Walsh suggests that this potential for shaping public policy is part of a finn's motivation in joining
the design phase of the CCX (Walsh: 10/24/02).

Recognition Under Future Regulations
The benefits of engaging in voluntary pollution abatement would be reduced if present
actions, and documented emissions reductions, were not going to be recognized under the expected
future regulatory regime. The people at the cutting edge of the emissions trading market are
confident, though, that documented emissions reductions will get credit for early action under future
policy (Walsh: 10/24/02; C02e.com; CCX PowerPoint). Moreover, as was previously explained, it
is highly likely that future GHG legislation will take the form of a cap-and-trade system. The
aforementioned energy efficiency improvements are most beneficial to a company if the reductions
are recorded in a legitimate registry of some sort.

Overseas Industry Pressure
One of the arguments used by representatives from the United States in refusing to sign the
Kyoto standards into domestic law is that the international treaty would put American companies at
a competitive disadvantage with the rest of the world. The argument states that the goods produced
by U.S. firms would have to be priced higher than goods produced abroad if U.S. firms face tighter
regulations on environmental health and safety, wages, etc. than foreign firms, and that U.S. goods
would therefore be priced out of the market. International trade treaties take into account the
uniformity of manufacturing environmental and workers' rights standards in some cases, and
ignore it in others. Now, with the Kyoto Protocol set to go into effect in the very near future,
American companies will face a different and less environmentally stringent set of regulations from
those in most other parts of the developed (and some of the developing) world. 12 Multinational
companies will be subject to local domestic GHG regulations, and it could be in their best interests
to employ some sort of internal emissions trading program like the one used by BP in order to
meet the domestic abatement standards. 13 If a company~s lE.S. operations are not included within
the Kyoto framework, however, internal abatements that involve U.S. facilities cannot be recognized,
and overall abatement might therefore be less cost-effective. Mike Walsh says there will probably
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be international, intracompany trading with the CCX, which could be another reason for U.S.-based
companies to sign on (Walsh: 10/24/02). It could be in the best interests of an international firm to
have a compliance strategy that is as flexible as possible, which might include emissions trading.
Voluntary participation iIi a trading system now would prepare a fIrm's staff to deal with a
mandatory System that might come along in the future or, in the case of Kyoto, within months.

Benefits Unrelated to Potential Regulation

Status As an Industry Leader
Corporate leadership, from the CEO, CPO or other top-level managers, is often cited as a
major driver in a fIrm's decision to reduce its GHG emissions by business leaders and academic
papers alike (Frey: 2002; Baylis et. al.: 1998). Howard Ris, President of the Union of Concerned
Scientists, says that "90 percent" of a fIrm's decision to engage in voluntary environmental
protection programs, particularly ones pertaining to GHG emissions and climate change, is
determined by the goals or mindset of the CEO (Ris: 12/5/02). Corporate environmental leadership
has become almost popular among some large businesses in the past decade. For example,
Interface, one of the world's biggest carpet manufacturers, has the ultimate sustainable goals of
zero waste and closed-loop production, goals put in place by its corporate leadership (Henningsen:
2002). Deutsche Bank has been involved in the United Nations Environmental Program, the
Bellagio Forum for Sustainable Development and the World Bank Prototype Carbon Fund. A
spokesman for the bank's Board of Managing Directors, Rolf-E Breuer, is quoted as saying,
"'sustainability it not an abstract idea.. .it is an important element of[our] corporate policy and a
signifIcant factor driving [our] business policy decisions'" (Henningsen: 2002, 167).
Once again, oil companies like BP and Shell are jumping on the bandwagon, too. John
Browne of BP calls ducking out of responsibility toward the environment, "a failure of leadership"
(Frey: 2002). In 1998, Browne committed his company, with current gross revenues of $174
billion, to carbon emission reductions of 10 percent below 1990 levels by the year 2010, a
commitment more ambitious than the Kyoto Protocol. His company achieved the goal in 2001,
nine years ahead of schedule (Frey: 2002; BP: 2002). The company met its internal standards
quickly - and at no net cost to business - by engaging in intracompany emissions trading, that is,
14
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trading ERCs among BP business units around the world (BP: 2002; Frey: 2002).14 The issue is
both a civic and a business one for Browne, who told the New York Times Magazine, "Climate
change is an issue which raises fundamental questions about the relationship between companies
and society as a whole, and between one generation and the next" (Frey: 2002). He also makes the
case that what is good for the climate is also good for business, particularly if the regulation he
expects comes to fruition. Browne operates with the outlook that fossil fuels will probably be
phased out in 30 to 50 years, but that regulation of GHG emissions will come much sooner than
that (Frey: 2002; Lowe & Harris: 1998). Today, BP is working with the Pew Center for Global
Climate Change, C02e.com and the lETA to design ERC trading programs.

Shareholder/ Investment Market Goodwill
Company shareholders and other investment market agents can put significant pressure on
firms to change their environmental and social actions for the better. A large portion of the
literature states that investors can be active in the greening of a company, either through direct
shareholder resolution or through the initial decision to invest (Prakash: 2002; Henningsen: 2002;
Knoepfel: 2001; Guttmann: 1998). A direct shareholder resolution forced ExxonMobil to divest
from the Global Climate Coalition, a lobbying group aimed at delegitimizing climate change
(Gelbspan: 2002). More recently, in early December of 2002, a religious group called the Interfaith
Center on Corporate Responsibilities filed shareholder resolutions with Ford and General Motors,
asking the auto manufacturers to reduce GHG emissions in both its manufacturing plants and its
products - cars, trucks and SUVs (ENS: 2002). It is as of yet unclear what effect the resolution has
had on the fmns' management and operations.
Sometimes investment decisions are based on social and environmental quality indicators
not necessarily because the investor cares about workers or the climate, but rather because she
wants to make the most possible money off of her investments. According to Ivo Knoepfel, Head
of Rating and Index Research at SAMS Sustainability Group and a co-chair of the Global
Reporting Initiative's Measurement Working Group,

"inqe~singly,

investors use corporate

sustainability as a proxy for enlightened and disciplined management" (Knoepfel: 2001). This
concept ties in with the notion of corporate leadership discussed above. Certain CEOs echo this
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theory, such as Harry Kraemer, Jr., of Baxter International. Kraemer believes that, "'sustainable
development provides a framework to create opportunities out of these winds of change,'" and that
such changes improve the bottom line and, therefore, dividends (Henningsen: 2002, 167). It is
becoming widely accepted in the investment industry that environmental and social screens "add
value to the screening process" by providing evidence of strong, innovative and aggressive
leadership (Henningsen: 2002, 165; Knoepfel: 2001). According to the Dow Jones Sustainability
Group Index (DJSGI), companies listed on the DJSGI had better average returns on equity,
investments and assets than companies in the regular Dow Jones Global Index (DJGl) from 1993
to August of 2000 (Knoepfel: 2001,7).
Economists Jerome Foulon, Paul Lanoie and Benoit Laplante cite three studies which have
shown that publicly disclosed information drives increases in market share value when the
disclosure is of superior performance, and drives share prices downward when the disclosure is
negative (Foulon et. al.: 2001, 170). The number of invested dollars illustrates the degree to which
shareholders value corporate responsibility indicators, for one reason or another. Over $2 trillion
are in socially responsible investments under professional management in the United States.
According to Carsten Henningsen of Progressive Investment Management, total U.S. assets in
social investments grew 36 percent from 1999 to 2001, over 1.5 times the 22 percent overall
increase for all investment assets managed professionally in the same period (Henningsen: 2002).

Consumer Goodwill
Surveys and empirical studies report that consumers look for "green" labels on products
and are willing to pay more for such environmentally friendly goods and services (Prakash: 2002;
Arora & Cason: 1995; Arora & Gangopadhyay: 1995). Generally, companies that sell goods
directly to final consumers focus their advertising on brands and specific products, and are the most
likely to claim to be environmentally responsible (Prakash: 2002; Arora & Cason: 1995; Arora &
Gangopadhyay: 1995). A 1999 survey found that 50 percent of Americans claim to look for green
labels on the products they buy, and to switch brands based on their the firm's environmental
record. Not all of these people may be willing to pay the premium price that is often charged for
greener products (Prakash: 2002), but eConomists Seema Arora and Shubhashis Gangopadhyay
report that consumer markets are segmented, and that people who value environmental benefits and
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can afford them can support a market for "green" products (Arora & Gangopadhyay: 1995).
Arora and Gangopadhyay construct a two-stage game theoretical model in which ftrms decide on
the level of environmental cleanliness! control they will employ, and then compete in prices. They
fmd that, by setting different levels of environmental protection, the ftrms differentiate themselves
and are able to cater to a segmented market in which some consumers are willing to pay more than
others for additional environmental beneftts. Aseem Prakash, however, examines consumer surveys
and fmds that, according to a 1991 survey, 47 percent of consumers think that corporate
environmental claims are "gimmicks" (Prakash: 2002). Mandatory public reporting of pollution
enables consumers to see the differences between the environmental policies of the different ftrms,
if consumers choose to look up the information (Arora & Gangopadhyay: 1995; Prakash: 2002).
Mandatory public reporting of pollution and other environmental impacts, or public
disclosure, has been found to be a driver of consumer and investor decision-making. A number of
researchers conclude that public disclosure of environmental performance creates strong incentives
for a ftrm to engage in pollution control (poulon et at.: 2001; Arora & Cason: 1995; Arora &
Gangopadhyay: 1995; Guttmann: 1998). Public disclosure and the impact of community "rightto-know" laws on ftrm environmental performance are discussed in the following section.

Community GoodwilV Right-to-Know
Community goodwill is perhaps the broadest category of goodwill because the actors are
not as clearly defmed as they are in the shareholder and consumer goodwill categories. In fact,
shareholders and consumers can be considered part of the greater community that comes into
contact with a given ftrm, its products and its pollution. According to John Guttmann,
environmental organizations and community members see themselves as "stakeholders" in the
polluters' operations, and feel they have a rightto know about environmental infractions and a right
to be involved in the regulatory process (Guttmann: 1998,85).
Paul Wapner writes about grassroots community activism in his essay, "Politics Beyond
the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics," and concludes that transnational
environmental activist groups like Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund politicize societies, or
motivate citizens, by bringing "hidden" or unknown environmental abuses to the surface (Wapner:
1998,515). This politicization yields signiftcant positive results in many cases. Motivated citizens
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are often rallied into a boycott of a certain offending product or company (non-dolphin-safe tuna
and McDonald's styrofoam hamburger containers are two classic examples), and the community/
consumer! citizen groups are often successful in bringing about changes in corporate policies, at
least at the visible level. Greenpeace, for example, is currently organizing boycotts of ExxonMobil
gas stations because of ExxonMobil's refusal to address climate change. A Business Week article
on environmental activism by Laura Cohn and Heather Timmons notes that a Deutsche Bank report
on ExxonMobil states, '''Being handed a reputation as environmental enemy No.1 for such a big
customer-facing business has to be considered a brand risk'" (Cohn & Timmons: 2002). The
same article quotes Phil Capp, the President of a Washington, DC-based lobbying group, as saying,
"'Companies are very sensitive to anything that would put their brand name in a bad light,' (Cohn
& Timmons: 2002). It is evident from these and other anecdotes, as well as empirical tests, that

activist groups can put pressure on corporations by mobilizing communities.
Citizens do not just rely on Greenpeace to inform them of environmental damages in their
neighborhoods, though. Community right-to-know sources like the U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Inventory and the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), a mandatory self-reporting system for over 320
chemicals that was established in 1988 to track release and transport of toxic materials, are relatively
accessible public databases that list the toxic releases and transfers, GHG emissions and other
environmental damages of individual companies and/or operating facilities. Both Mike Walsh of
the CCX and attorney/ author John Guttmann believe that expansions of these and other right-toknow laws, and the attendant direct public involvement in the oversight of both large and small
corporations, are becoming regulatory drivers (Walsh: 10/24/02; Guttmann: 1998). Foulon et. al.
conducts an empirical analysis of the relative impact of "traditional enforcement" and information
strategies (public disclosure) in pollution control undertaken by a ftrm, and conclude that,
" ... evidence that the public disclosure of environmental performance does create additional and
strong incentives for pollution control" (Foulon et al.: 2001, 169). The researchers also find
evidence that appearing on a public list of polluters has a stronger impact on firm behavioral
changes than do monetary fines (Foulon et al.: 2001; 185).
Robert Baylis, Lianne Connell and Andrew Flynn look at the relationship that company size
and existing regulations have on a f1l1Ii's perceptions of the stimuli that drive them to improve their
environmental records,

an~ come

to a similar result in their paper, "Company Size, Environmental
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Regulation and Ecological Modernization: Further Analysis at the Level of the Firm." They
conclude that social responsibility is a significant driving factor in a firm's decision to improve its
environmental record (more so among large companies than among small-ta-medium enterprises),
and that local communities can influence industry (Baylis et. al.: 1998). With the amount of media
attention that climate change, ratification of the Kyoto treaty and domestic non-involvement in the
entire global political process have received in recent months, it would not be surprising to learn that
citizens are beginning to take into account the climatic impacts of the companies they typically
patronize, much like Greenpeace has done with ExxonMobil.
These are significant findings, because they indicate that community activism can influence
company behavior as much as ..; or even more than - government-sanctioned regulation. Expansion
of community right-to-know programs could drive companies to "voluntarily" mitigate their
negative environmental impacts. Not every community is made up of empowered and vocal
citizens, though, as a 1996 study by Seema Arora and Timothy Cason illustrates, entitled, "Do
Community Characteristics Determine Environmental Outcomes? Evidence from the Toxic Release
Inventory." Arora and Cason look at toxic releases from the TRI database, voter turnout and
socioeconomic, gender and racial factors to test the significance of each of these on the
environmental performance of polluters in thousands of designated geographic regions around the
United States. Overall, they find that the variables presumed to affect the likelihood that
communities will engage in political action, including voting, significantly increase environmental
performance. These variables include higher education, catpooling to work, having kids,
employment in manufacturing industries, median age and percentage of residents renting their
primary residences (Arora & Cason: 1996). They also conclude that economic variables
significantly impact toxic releases: poorer neighborhoods have higher rates of toxic releases, and
very wealthy neighborhoods have the least (Arora & Cason: 1996).15 These results are important
because they indicate that there could be geographic or demographic aspects to firms'
environmental performance. It also means that "policy threats" could include civil action as well
as government mandate, and variables contributing to an~tive citizenry should therefore be
incorporated into any empirical study of voluntary participation in environmental programs.
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Chapter Two
The 33/50 Program and A Firm-Level Model of Participation

The 33/50 Program is a voluntary chemical pollution prevention program that was initiated
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1991. 16 The Program had the goals of
reducing the releases and transfers of 17 highly toxic chemicals by 33 percent by the end of 1992
and by 50 percent by the end of 1995. It was a temporary pilot program that only ran from 1991 to
1995, and is therefore not in operation today. Unlike many EPA programs, the focus of the 33/50
Pr~gram

was on prevention rather than containment or other "end-of-pipe" pollution remedies.

The EPA offered the opportunity to participate to 555 companies that had "substantial chemical
releases" in February of 1991, and to 5,000 more companies in July of 1991. Over the next three
years, 2,500 more invitations were offered to selected facilities (U.S. EPA: 1999). According to the
EPA, almost 1,300 companies joined the 33/50 Program. The EPA dedicated most of its outreach
to the 600 companies with the largest volumes of releases and transfers, and participation among
these companies was 64 percent, versus under 14 percent for the smaller fInns. According to the
EPA, 1,066 of the 1,294 participants set measurable reduction goals that represented almost a
halving of these fIrms' 1988 releases and transfers (1988 was the baseline year).11
There have been a few economic analyses of the 33/50 Program, which has been dubbed
successful in achieving its chemical release and transport reduction goals in a timely and costeffective manner. One such study, a paper by economists Seema Arora and Anthony Cason
entitled, "An Experiment in Voluntary Environmental Regulation: Participation in EPA's 33/50
Program," thoroughly examines the fIrm-level characteristics that affect the probability with which
a fIrm will join the Program. Their theory is based upon the notion that, if a fIrm's expected profIt
with participation in the Program (EIIi,p) is greater than the fIrm's expected profIt without
participation (EIIi,N), then the profIt-maximizing fIrm will join the Program. Arora and Cason use
a dummy variable Di to denote fIrm i's participation decision: Di will be equal to one if expected
profIts are greater with participation, and zero if expected profIts are lower with participation. This
is illustrated by the following expression: 18
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Arora and Cason use a bivariate probit model to detennine the likelihood with which a given
polluter will voluntarily join the Program. Their righthand side variables are all factors presumed to
affect firms' expected profits.
Arora and Cason assume that, first and foremost, differences in technologies and
production processes across industries will change the benefits and costs of participation in the

33/50 Program or, in fact, any other voluntary program. Cleaner production technologies may not
be available for certain industries, and the existence and character of manufacturers' associations
may influence any individual firm's decision to participate. The amount of money any given
industry tends to spend on research and development might affect participation rates within that
industry, mostly because of the theory that technologically advanced finns are best positioned to
profit from Program participation. The authors also mention that a firm's proximity to consumers
will affect the decision to participate. These last two theories were discussed in Chapter One of this
paper. Arora and Cason hypothesize that the market structure of a given industry will also affect
participation: firms in more competitive industries would have greater incentive to differentiate their
products than firms in less competitive industries, but firms in competitive industries would also
have a more difficult time passing additional costs on to consumers. The authors expect
participation rates to be lower in more competitive industries. They suggest that firms that use the
greatest number of Program chemicals will have the most opportunities for mitigation, and will
therefore have higher participation rates than firms which use fewer of the 17 Program chemicals.
They do note, however, that firms with the largest ratios of chemical use to sales would,
theoretically, have lower probability rates than firms for which the chemicals are not as intrinsic to
the production process. Finally, they hypothesize that firms which are more profitable and healthier
financially will be the most likely to participate in the Program, since these firms will not have the
.. ~ . """' .."

.'

short-term tunnel vision of financially strapped companies (Arora & Cason: 1995).
Arora and Cason use EPA data from the 33/50 Program and the Toxic Release lriventory
(TRI) to provide environmental data and to examine the chemical use ofthe seven industries with
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the largest releases and transfers of the 17 chemicals covered under the Program. The seven
industries are: chemicals (SIC 28), petroleum refining (SIC 29), rubber and plastics (SIC 30),
primary metals (SIC 33), fabricated metals (SIC 34), electrical equipment (SIC 36) and
transportation (SIC 37). The researchers use two other main sources of data: the EPA's Human
Health and Ecotoxicity database (HHED), which is used to assign toxicities to the 17 different
chemicals, and Standard & Poor's Compustat database, which supplies financial data on individual
firms. The financial data they use is from 1990, the year before the Program began. Only 302
large, publicly traded firms "survived" the merging of the 33/50 Program, TRI and Compustat
databases. They use a bivariate probit model, with the yes/no decision to participate in the Program
as of February 1992, as given by the Di dummy variable, being the lefthand side variable. Table I
provides a list of the righthand side variables they used, each variable's symbol, the estimated sign
and the significance given by Arora and Cason's model.
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TABLE I: Arora and Cason's Finn-Level Model- Variables and Results

Variable

Proxy

Symbol

Estimated Sign

Significance
(!es/no)

Employment

Finn Size

EMPLT

positive

yes

5-Year Average
Return on Assets

A finn's profitability PROFIT

positive

yes

Debt-to-Asset Ratio

A finn's financial
structure and debt
obligations

DTARATIO

negative

no

Herfindahl Index of
Industry
Concentration

Industry
concentration!
competitiveness

HERF

negative

yes

ADINT
Advertising Intensity The proximity of a
finn's products to the
consumer

negative

no

Technological ability RDINT
ofa finn to
participate in the
Program

positive

no

Aggregate toxicity
WIREL
Total Releases,
Weighted by Toxicity level of the chemicals
used by a finn;
captures potential
gains from Program
participation

positive

yes

RELINT
Intensity of Chemical Importance of
Program chemicals to
Use
a finn's production;
Ability of a finn to
participate in the
Program

negative

no

Number of Categories Captures potential
gains from Program
of Program
Chemicals Used
participation

positive

yes

Research &
Development
Intensity

NOCAT

~-
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Arora and Cason's results imply that there are several firm- and industry-level
characteristics that affect the likelihood that an individual company will participate in the 33/50
Program. Their model does not, however, address how the costs and benefits of participation might
be ·affected by threats of mandatory regulation. The authors state that the paper's purpose is to,
"assess the potential ability of voluntary programs to augment more contentious command and
control regulation," but they do not measure the effect(s) that the threat of such regulation might
have on aftrm's decision to participate. By omitting variables relating to legislative threats, Arora
and Cason may have left out several significant categories of benefits and costs of Program
participation - namely, future competitive advantage, first-mover advantage, recognition under future
regulation and overseas industry pressure. The empirical model that appears in Chapter Three is
an attempt to remedy their omissions and measure the effects that governmental and other public
,~

'"

bargaining powers may have on a fmn's weighing of the costs and benefits of Program

I~

!i

participation and, therefore, the firm's participation decision.
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Chapter Three
The Empirical Model
Introduction

The empirical portion of this paper uses an ordinary least squares regression to test 11
variables for their potential effects on state-level participation in the 33/50 Program. The dependent
variable is the cumulative participation rate of the facilities invited to join the Program in each state,
and is denoted PRs . Participation is measured as the number of facilities in each state that
participated in the Program over the number of facilities that the EPA invited to join, and is the
program-end, cumulative participation rate. The lowest participation rate (13.3 percent) belongs to
Rhode Island, and the highest participation rate (51.9 percent) belongs to Delaware. The mean
participation rate (31.3 percent) is closest to that of Connecticut (31.4 percent), Arizona (31.1
percent), Arkansas (31.5 percent), Florida (30.8 percent) and Alabama (30.5 percent). The standard
deviation of the participation rates is roughly .068814; the complete table of descriptive statistics
appears in Table II on page 33. This five-state sampling, and the states with the minimum and
maximum participation rates, suggest no pattern of participation that is strictly geographical. Data
used to compute the participation rates come from "33/50 Program: The Final Record," a
summary document published by the EPA in March of 1999.
The right-hand side variables represent 11 aggregate political and economic characteristics
of the 48 continental states; the District of Columbia, Alaska and Hawaii, while they had facilities
participating in the Program, have to be excluded from the regression analysis because of missing
data. The first five variables in the model below, ASNCs , AVRs , LCVs , SCMs and PDUMs , are all
proxied indicators of the level of "public bargaining power" that is present in a state, as Kathleen
Segerson and Thomas 1. Miceli would put it. The next two variables, PMEs and PSICs , proxy the
level of political bargaining power held by manufacturing industries within a state, i.e., the political
clout or bargaining power of the industries most susceptible to regulation of toxic chemical use.
The remaining variables, IMECs , SIZEs, URs and CEVSs:"measure relative economic characteristics
of the states and, in particular, manufacturing industries. The subsequent paragraphs define each
variable and proceed to explain how the data for each were gathered and what, if any, manipulations
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were done. The results of the regression and tests are in Chapter Four.

The Model:

PR s ={3o+ {31ASNCs+ {32AVRs+ {33LCVs+ {34SCMs+ {35PDUMs+ {36PMEs+ {37PSICs+
{38IMECs+ {39SIZEs+ {3lOURs+ {31 lCEVSs + &

Where PDUMs is a dummy variable such that:

PDUMs = {

1 if the plurality of survey respondents identifies with the Democratic party

}

o if the plurality of survey respondents does not identify with the Democratic party

s = state in the continental United States
I,

Descriptions of the Variables

The variable ASNCs is a proxy for the threat of enforcement of hazardous waste regulations
in each state for the years 1991 - 1995. The variable represents the number of Addressed
Significant Non-Compliances (SNCs) of three EPA hazardous waste regulations: the Emergency
Protection and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).19 "Addressed SNCs" is a
percentage of the number of SNCs addressed by the EPA in a state over the total number of SNCs
reported in that state for the three EPA programs. The EPCRA, RCRA and TSCA programs
regulate the reporting of toxic chemical use, the disposal of solid and hazardous wastes and the use
of certain chemicals and other controlled substanc.e.~."respectively.20 These programs are all similar
to the 33/50 Program in that they govern the use and disposal of toxic chemicals and hazardous
wastes, and the 33/50 Program was designed to reduce the releases and transfers of these same
chemicals. The EPA enforcement database used to compute these data gives the total number of
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SNCs, the number of addressed SNCs, and the percentage of addressed/total SNCs for each year
in which there were SNCs for each of the three programs. The variable ASNCs closely proxies the
level of mandatory toxic use and release regulatory threat that the facilities invited to join the 33/50
Program would have felt when making their participation decisions. The numbers used in the
empirical model are the total average percentages of addressed SNCs over the period 1991 - 1995.
It is expected that the coefficient on ASNCs will be positive, since fIrms would feel a stronger threat

of mandatory regulation if the EPA in a given state operates in a thorough and strict manner when
dealing with noncompliance. A regulatory body would be seen as less threatening, and less likely
to enforce new mandatory legislation, if it cannot even address violations of existing laws.
Descriptive statistics for ASNCs are in Table II.
The variable A VRs is a proxy for the political participation rates and overall political! civic
engagement of the voting-age population of each state. This proxy is the average presidential
voting rate in each state, calculated as the average of the voting rates in the 1988, 1992 and 1996
presidential elections.21 It is hard to predict the sign that the coefficient on AVRs might have,
because the political awareness of registered voters could have either a positive or negative effect on
the level of threat of impending regulation felt by a fIrm. Depending on the interests of voters, high
. values for A VRs could signal bargaining power on the (publiC) side of the regulatory body or on the
side of the manufacturing industry. If voters are extremely concerned with environmental issues,
then high values of A VRs should increase the bargaining power of the public regulatory body,
thereby increasing the threat of legislation and prompting more fIrms to join the 33/50 Program.
On the other hand, if there is little concern for environmental issues, and particularly if a signifIcant
portion of the state's economy and, therefore, political interests, is made up of manufacturing, then
the coefficient on A VRs would probably be negative, since fIrms would feel less pressure from local
communities to reduce chemical use. The effect of voting rates on the model will, therefore,
probably be mixed. Descriptive statistics for A VRs appear in Table II.
The level of awareness and attentiveness that a state's Congressional delegation has toward
environmental issues, and, to a lesser degree, the way in which Members of the U.S. House and
Senate perceive the concerns of their constituents, is proxied by the LCVs variable. These values
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are the pro-environmental health and safety voting ratings given to each member of Congress by the
League of Conservation Voters (LCV), an environmental watchdog and lobbying group based in
Washington, D.C., for the years 1989 through 1995. Each year the LCV determines which
legislative bills are pro-environment and which bills are anti-environment, and then tallies how each
Member of Congress voted on those bills. The higher the LCV rating, expressed as a percent, the
more pro-environment the representative or senator.22 The data that enter into the regression are the
aggregate, average scores for each state's delegation between 1989 and 1998. The scores, given as
a percentage, for each state's Senators and Representatives were added together for each of the
years 1989 through 1995 and divided by two to get an overall score for the state for each year. In
essence, the LCVs variable is another proxy for the state-level threat of environmental regulation
and! or stringency, manifested in the decisions made by elected officials. The sign on the
coefficient of LCVs is expected to be positive: the fIrms invited to participate in the 33/50 Program
might have felt higher levels of regulatory threat in states where the elected national representatives
were pro-environment than in states where the elected representatives voted against the interests of
environmental health and safety. According to the theories used to form this model, this perceived
higher likelihood of impending anti-pollution legislation should raise the benefIts of participation to
the fIrm, and therefore increase~e voluntary participation rate. pescriptive statistics for LCVs
appear in Table ll.
Another variable that proxies citizens' bargaining power in environmental regulatory
decision making is SCMs , annual Sierra Club membership measured as the number of Sierra Club
Members in a state in each year 1990 -1995, divided by the total population of that state in each
year. Sierra Club membership information was provided by the Sierra Club, and state population
data were obtained from population forecasts conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau.23 Whereas
the average voting rate is only a proxy for citizens' political and social engagement, membership in
the Sierra Club, one of the nation's fIrst environmental interest groups, indicates proactive political
engagement and, more specifIcally, concern with enyironmental issues. It was explained in Chapter
One of this paper that stakeholders' environmental concerns can have signifIcant effects on a
fIrm's decision to participate in a voluntary environmental program, particularly if the fIrm's
emissions are publicized, as they are for most of the finris invited to join the EPA's 33/50 Program.
28
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Therefore, it is expected that the more Sierra Club members there are as a percentage of total state
population, the higher the environmental community's bargaining power will be and, therefore, the
higher Program participation rates will be. The sign on the coefficient of SCMs is expected to be
positive. Descriptive statistics for SCMs appear in Table II.
The only qualitative dummy variable in this model is PDUMs , which gives a rough picture
of the state's political leanings. The variable PDUMs is entered into the equation as a one if the
plurality of a state's residents.consider themselves Democrats (as opposed to Republicans or
Independents).24 The LCV annual Scorecard rates Members of the U.S. Congress on
environmental issues, with the higher scores going to those Members who cast the most votes in
favor of environmental health and safety. The Scorecards produced immediately prior to and
during the duration of the 33/50 Program, as well as every Scorecard since then, give Democratic
Members much higher ratings than Republican Members. 2S The sign on the coefficient of PDUMs
is expected to be positive, since firms in Democratic-leaning states should, theoretically, feel
pressure to have better environmental records, assuming those Democrats support environmental
initiatives with the same consistency as do the men and women they elect to Congress.
The percentag~ of each state's total-employment that is made up by employment in
manufacturing is contained in the variable PMEs. This variable proxies the economic importance of
manufacturing to the residents of the state, and, therefore, part of the bargaining power of
manufacturing industries. Polluting industries that make up a significant portion of a state's
economy and wage base should, theoretically, have a proportionate say in the decisions affecting
their businesses. If state manufacturing industries do not want environmental regulation, then a
large value for PMEs will suppress participation in the 33/50 Program and, presumably, other
environmental health and safety programs. On the other hand, a progressive state, or a state with
manufacturing companies that see profit in clean production, might actually [md that a big
manufacturing sector will promote participation in environmental programs. In other words, the
.. ~,
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sign that this variable is expected to have is uncertain, but it is most likely to be negative. The
PMEs values are the product of employment in manufacturing over total employment for each state,
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as given by the 1990 Census. 26 Descriptive statistics for PMEs appear in Table II.
The 33/50 Program concentrated much of its recruiting energy on the 600 companies with
the most releases and transfers of the relevant chemicals; these were the flrst companies asked to
join the Program. 27 Arora and Cason look at data from companies with SIC codes from the
industries that have, according to their 1995 paper, the largest releases and transfers of 33/50
chemicals. 28 Those industries are: chemicals (SIC 28), petroleum refining (SIC 29), rubber and
plastics (SIC 30), primary metals (SIC 33), fabricated metals (SIC 34), electrical equipment (SIC
36) and transportation (SIC 37). Since both very dirty and very clean industries fall under the
general category of manufacturing, including an estimate of the relative "dirtiness" of the
manufacturing sector in each state should be a proxy for the anti-regulation industrial lobbying
power. To estimate the composition of a state's manufacturing industry, the variable PSICs is
,'

1

included in this model. PSICs gives the percentage of manufacturing facilities within each state that
have one of the seven SIC codes listed above. The values are calculated with data from the 1995
Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) Geographic Area Statistics report, and represent the
number of facilities within industries with SIC codes of 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 36 and 37 in each state
divided by the total number of manufacturing facilities in each state, averaged over the years 1989 1995.29 In terms of bargaining power, there is strength in numbers, and so the greater the
percentage of a state's manufacturing industry that is made up of these seven dirty industries, the
more bargaining power these industries could have in preventing the imposition of mandatory
pollution control legislation. Recall that, according to the hypothesis, the higher the industrial
bargaining power is relative to that of the regulator, the lower flrms will perceive the potential
benefits of voluntary participation to be. On the other hand, a large group of heavy polluters might
make companies in a state with a high value for PSICs targets for citizen and environmental activist
groups; this would tilt bargaining power in favor of the public. To complicate things further,
though, a state with a high value for PSICs suggests relatively high employment in these industries:
and the (voting) public in such a state might therefore "lIbt consider environmental health and safety
to be top concerns when compared to their livelihoods, if that is how they see the matter. If this is
the case, then political bargaining power swings back to industry. Overall, given the mix of
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possible influences that dirty industries might have on the balance of regulatory/ industrial
bargaining power within a state, the sign on the coefficient of the PSICs variable is still expected to
be negative, since it is a proxy for the bargaining power of industry. Descriptive statistics for

PSICs appear in Table n.
The IMECs variable gives values for the change in the index of state manufacturing
employment between 1989 and 1995, and indicates the growth of manufacturing employment in a
state over the course of the Program. The data used for this variable come from the 1995 ASM
Geographic Area Statistics report, which uses 1987 as the baseline year and enters numbers less
than 100 to indicate a drop in manufacturing employment compared with the baseline year, and
number over 100 to indicate a rise in manufacturing employment in each year. The index numbers
for each year 1989 through 1995 are averaged to get an overall number that indicates whether
manufacturing employment rose or fell during the course of the 33/50 Program. The mean index
number for 199 observations is about 104, and the median is 103, signaling an overall increase in
manufacturing during the years the Program was in operation. The other descriptive statistics for

IMECs can be seen in Table II. The effect of manufacturing growth over the course of the program
could have both negative and positive effects on the program. First, a growing manufacturing
sector could give existing manufacturing fIrms, i.e., the ones that were asked to join the 33/50
Program, more bargaining power versus the public regulatory body and, therefore, less of an
incentive to join the voluntary Program. Moreover, a growing manufacturing sector could, but does
not necessarily, suggest that a state with a high value for IMECs has relatively lax enforcement of
environmental policies, or offers other incentives to attract manufacturers. There is the possibility,
though, that new manufacturing facilities would operate "cleaner" than existing manufacturing
facilities, because the capital equipment will be new for those fInns. If this is in fact the case, and
the IMECs value is greater than 100, i.e., the manufacturing sector is growing, then older and dirtier
facilities might feel local industry pressure to voluntarily reduce chemical releases and join the the
33/50 Program. Overall, though, the coefficient on the IMECs variable is expected to be negative,
since the theory of increased bargaining power for companies within a growing industry or sector
seems as though it would have a greater impact on participation rates than the less direct internal
"shaming" theory of industry.
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Much of the theoretical literature suggests that larger firms are more likely than smaller
ones to engage in voluntary environmental protection. SeemaArora and Timothy Cason's
empirical study of 33/50 Program participation concludes that finn size has a positive and
significant impact on participation, i.e., larger firms were significantly more likely to join the
Program (Arora & Cason: 1995). Robert Baylis, Lianne Connell and Andrew Flynn write in their
article, "Company Size, Environmental Regulation and Ecological Modernization: Further Analysis
at the Level of the Firm," that, "the opportunities and abilities to manage environmental impacts
better are likely to be skewed towards larger flrms" (Baylis et. al.: 1998,286). Of the companies
these researchers survey, 63 percent of the large companies have environmental policies, while only
17 percent of small-to-medium companies surveyed have environmental policies. In the paper
written by Baylis et. al. and in others, company size is linked to other motivations for participation,
such as increased public visibility for larger frnns, for example. Particularly in the case where a
facility publicly reports pollution, larger frnns with larger volumes of chemical releases tend to be
targeted by stakeholders for improved environmental policies and practices, and may also be the
best equipped to eliminate significant amounts of pollution from their processes (Baylis et. al.:
1998; Arora & Cason: 1995; Wapner: 1998). Moreover, large companies might experience greater
flexibility in achieving ambitious voluntary standards. For example, it is unlikely that BP could
have had such a successful and efficient internal GHG emissions trading program if it hadn't been
such a large, geographically dispersed corporation. 30 The SIZEs variable in this model gives the
average size of a manufacturing facility in a state, measured as total manufacturing employment
over the total number of manufacturing facilities in each state, averaged over the years 1989 1995.31 It should be noted that the average size of a facility asked to join to 33/50 Program and the
overall average size of a manufacturing facility might differ, because the EPA targeted the facilities
that had the largest chemical releases and transfers, i.e., mostly the biggest facilities. While the
SIZEs variable is therefore not as accurate as desired, it still paints an overall picture of the sizfe of
manufacturers in each state, and, possibly, the likelihood that facilities were asked to join the
._$O~.,>-
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Program and did join. It is expected that the sign on the coefficient of SIZEs will be positive, since,
in keeping with the theoretical discussion above, bigger facilities see greater pressure to adopt
environmental protection programs than smaller companies, and the benefits of participation - and
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the costs of non-participation - might therefore be greater for large fIrms than for small. The
descriptive statistics for SIZEs appear in Table ll.
The statewide unemployment rate, denoted URs in this model, is an indicator of general
economic health in a state, and may also be an indicator of the degree to which workers, including
unemployed workers, put political emphasis on environmental health and safety issues. It is a
common belief that there exists a tradeoff between jobs and the environment, particularly among
industries that are heavily monitored for environmental infractions, like the logging and
manufacturing industries. Therefore, it may be that states with high unemployment rates have lower
Program participation rates than other states, because there could be less pressure coming from
citizens to mitigate environmental hazards than there is to create new jobs - the bargaining power of
the public, in the presence of high unemployment, might favor a moratorium on new
environmentally related laws or even a rollback of existing laws. On the other hand, there is a more
direct link between unemployment rates and participation rates in the other direction: a high
unemployment rate means that a state's economy has slowed, and that manufacturing production
might have slowed as well. If a facility sees benefIts to participating in the 33/50 Program, and if
that facility is not operating at full capacity - full employment - anyway, then the facility may be
able to claim pollution "reductions" without changing anything about their manufacturing
processes except that amount of the good that is produced. Avoiding capital and other costs
typically associated with corporate environmental efforts make it more likely that a fIrm will see the
benefIts of participation as outweighing the costs, and will therefore be more likely to join the
Program. In other words, unemployment may promote participation in the Program because it
makes participation easier: rather than operating at full capacity and changing its production
processes, a facility can simply cut production and reduce emissions that way. The total 16-andover unemployment rate in each state is tallied for each year 1989 - 1995, and then averaged to get
an average unemployment rate for each state during the planning and implementation parts of the
33/50 Program.32 Since the link between unemployment and the reduced operation of

manufacturing facilities is more direct than the link between unemployment, citizen preferences and
potential policy threats, it is expected that the sign on the coeffIcient of URs will be positive. Data
for the URs variable come from the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Descriptive statistics for URs are available in Table II.
The fmal variable in this model, CEVSs , is an average of the rate of new manufacturing
capital expenditures over the value of manufacturing shipments for each year 1989 - 1995.33 The
larger the value is for this rate, the more expansive is a state's manufacturing economy. Thus, this
variable proxies manufacturing growth and development within a state. Whereas the
unemployment rate is a rather pessimistic way to view participation in the Program, the rate of
capital expenditures over the value of shipments indicates how an expanding economy can also be
good for the environment. If the new capital being purchased is replacing older, dirtier capital
equipment, then these expenditures proxy a baseline "greening" of industry. Similarly, if new
capital is being bought to build new factories, business owners might take the operating efficiency
of the equipment into account before making the purchase, either assuming that their facilities will
be subject to increasingly strict environmental regulations, or because it makes sense in terms of
operating efficiency. Thus, it is expected that the sign on the coefficient of CEVSs will be positive.
Descriptive statistics for CEVSs appear in Table II.
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TABLE II: Descriptive Statistics

ASNC
0.534948
0.549242
0.792089
0.182578
0.143267
-0.562096
3.079706

AYE.

Median
Maximum
Minimum
::itd, I;2ey.
::ikewness
Kurtosis

PR
0.312573
0.316349
0.519231
0.133333
0.068814
0.065412
4.495537

Jargpe-Bera
Probability

4.507492
0.105005

Sum
::ium ::iq. Dey.
Qbseryations

SCM
0.001601
0.001438
0.005006
0.000356
0.001019
1.61505
5.94072

fllliM

0.604257
0.6105
0.700333
0.509333
0.054594
-0.11614
2.009722

LCV
0.982202
0.975714
1.828571
0.105714
0.406115
0.137275
2.414416

2.540321
0.280787

2.069207
0.355367

0.836573
0.658174

38.16275
0

8.06588
0.01772

15.00349
0.222561

25.67752
0.964697

29.00433
0.140085

47.14571
7.751686

0.076844
4.88E-05

19
11.4792

48

48

48

48

48

48

PSIC
0.056973
0.056798
0.098333
0.029991
0.013825
0.439579
3.413832

IMEC
103.7708
102.75
138.75
77.25
14.89902
0.303183
2.79782

SIZE
46.72202
44.47413
90.50204
15.57093
15.24652
0.268759
3.299354

.uR

Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dey.
Skewness
Kurtosis

PME
0.16879
0.171888
0.266912
fW59422
0.05494
-0.206562
2.296651

0.057994
0.058571
0.095286
0.027571
0.011738
0.169365
4.260633

CEVS
0.03527
0.03302
0.06657
0.02119
0.00843
1.31566
5.67685

Jm!lue-Bera
Probability

1.330741
0.514083

1.88835
0.389

0.817115
0.664608

0.757076
0.684862

3.407867
0.181966

28.1789
0

::ium
Sum Sq. Dey.

8.101902
0.141865

2.734689
0.008983

4981
10433.1

2242.657
10925.45

2.783714
0.006475

1.69295
0.00334

Obs~ations

48

48

48

48

48

48

~

:;-

~
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0.39583
0
1
0
0.49420
0.42601
1.18149

Chapter Four
Empirical Results and Analysis

The ordinary least squares regression presented in Chapter Three yields a number of
significant variables, and the signs on almost all coefficients are as predicted by the theoretical
considerations. The model is rewritten for reference, and the summary statistics for the regression
appear below. Table ill provides the critical values needed to conduct tests for statistical
significance.

PR s = {3o+ {31ASNCs+ {32AVRs+ {33LCVs+ {34SCMs+ {35PDUMs+ {36PMEs+ {37PSICs+
{3sIMECs+ {39SIZEs+ {3lOURs+ {311CEVSs+ &

Among other things, the original regression analysis shows that the PDUMs variable has a
very small t-statistic, and is nowhere near significant at the 5% level. In order to find out if PDUMs
can be dropped from the model without significantly affecting it, an unrestricted model (the original
model with 11 right-hand side variables) and a restricted model (one without PDUMs in it) must be
compared. Removing PDUMs from the model might improve the fit of the model because the
dummy variable for political identification could be positively correlated with LCVs , given that,
according to the League of Conservation Voters Scorecards, Democrats are far more likely than
Republicans to support environmental health and safety protection in Congress. It might also be
positively correlated with SCMs, because, like the politicians they elect, Democratic voters tend to be
more supportive of environmental protection and public health and equity causes than Republican
voters. It's worth seeing whether or not the variable can be improved without hurting the fit of the
model, and possibly improving it. The equation for the restricted model and its summary statistics
are also given below.
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Restricted Mode/34:

PRs = {3o+ {31ASNCs+ {32AVRs+/33LCVs+ {34SCMs+ {36PMEs+ {37PSICs+
{3sIMECs+ {39SIZEs+ {3IOURs+ {3I1CEVSs+&

Summaty Statistics

ASNCs
AVRs
LCVs
SCMs
PDUMs
PMEs
PSICs
IMECs
SIZEs
URs
CEVSs

Original Model

Restricted Model

-0.124184**
(0.05251)
0.221123
(0.1667757)
-0.065883*
(0.025543)
17.14495
(10.37398)
0.016764
(0.02047)
-0.584379***
(0.211385)
-2.093138** *
(0.601088)
-0.000939
(0.000777)
0.004934***
(0.00091)
2.447438**
(1.022334)
1.873435*
(1.09601)

-0.111592**
(0.049984)
0.269495*
(0.156315)
-0.057292**
(0.023185)
19.03269*
(10.06954)
-------------

-------------0.626327***
(0.20417)
-2.098319***
(0.598374)
-0.000881
(0.00077)
0.005205***
(0.000844)
2.905887***
(0.851634)
1.686566
(1.067213)
* =significant at the 10% level
** =significant at the 5% level
*** =significant at the 1% level

The results of an F-test (estimated F = .689 < 4.08) indicate that PDUMs can be dropped
from the model without reducing the fit of the regressidri:' The adjusted R-squared is actually one
one-thousandth larger in the restricted model than in the umestricted model. This difference is
small, but nonetheless important to note, as it shows that the fit of the model is improved by the
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omission of PDUMs . Removal of PDUMs has the expected positive effects on the potentially
correlated variables LCVs and SCMs: the coefficient of LCVs becomes less negative, and the
coefficient of SCMs gets larger.
The residual plot of the restricted model's regression shows several states whose
participation rates are over- or under-estimated by the regression. Louisiana, New Hampshire and
Oregon all have much higher Program participation rates than the model would suggest, and
Alabama, California, Kansas, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Virginia all have much lower
participation rates than the model's regression would give. These states range from being the
largest in the nation (California) to the smallest (Rhode Island) in terms of land area, and the other
states are representative of moderately sized states. Rhode Island has the lowest participation rate
(13.3 percent) and Louisiana has the second-to-highest (47 percent). The rest ofthe standout states
have participation rates much closer to the mean. This model, then, does not bias anyone region of
the United States, but it may provide inaccurate results for some states.
Residual Plot for the Restricted Model
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It is worthwhile testing the variables that are not presumed to be related to public or private
bargaining power - IMECs , SIZEs, URs and CEVs - for joint significance. According to the
restricted model, SIZEs and URs have significant and positive effects on participation rates at the 5
percent level.of significance; these outcomes are in line with what the theoretical argument predicts.
The variables IMECs and CEVs , though, are not significant to the model, although the signs on their
coefficients turn out to be as the theory predicts, too. In order to test for joint significance, the fit of
a new restricted model can be compared to the fit of the "old" restricted model, the model with all
variables except PDUMs :35

Restricted Model:

Summary Statistics

Restricted Model

ASNCs

-0.107177
(0.071319)
-0.229329
(0.180522)
-0.021141
(0.027518)
6.325905
(10.81921)
0.356142*
(0.186846)
-1.248993*
(0.730752)

AVRs
LCVs
SCMs
PMEs
PSICs

* = significant at the 10% level
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F-test:
Ho: {3s ={39 ={3JO ={3tt =0
Ha: Oile or more of the equalities above is false: the four variables are jointly significant.

F= (.180821- .077957) /(10-6) =12.535
.077957 / (48 -10)

Fijg ::= 2.61 at the 5% level of significance
A

F > F~s ~ Reject H~ at the 5% level of significance: IMECs,SIZEs,URs and CEVSs are
jointly significant to the model.

Table IV compares the expected sign of each of the coefficients to the sign that appears on
the estimated coefficient for each variable. All but two of the predictions based on theory and
previous empirical evidence are consistent with the results of the regression. It is interesting,
however, that the two variables that have unexpected effects on the model are the two variables
intended to proxy the bargaining power of the regulatory body (ASNCs ) and the federal
government (LCVs). Comparing the absolute values of each coefficient's t-statistic to the t-critical
value presented in Table ill, it is also evident that the coefficients of both of these variables are
strongly significant at the 5% level. It is expected in any econometric work that some of the
independent variables will not prove to be significant, and this expectation is again proven to be the
case in this model. However, the fact that two highly significant variables have the opposite-ofexpected effect on Program participation rates indicates that the theoretical arguments used to
justify the inclusion of these variables, and the model itself, must be reconsidered.
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TABLE ill: Infonnation for Statistical Tests

degrees of freedom:

48 - 10 = 38

two-sided test, critical value at 5% LOS:

2.024

two-sided test, critical value at 10% LOS:

1.686

TABLE IV: Expected vs. Estimated Signs

Variable

t -statistic

Ex~tedSign

Estimated Sign

ASNCs

-2.232548

+

-

AVRs

1.724054

+/-

+

LCVs

-2.471086

+

-

SCMs

1.890126

+

+

PMEs

-3.067667

-

-

PSICs

-3.506704

-

-

IMECs

-1.143896

-

-

SIZEs

6.165823

+

+

URs

3.41213

+
~

+

CEVSs

1.580346

+

+

..":4 -•• !/~
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Analysis

As far as the direction of the effect on 33/50 Program participation rates that each variable
was predicted to take, most of the independent variables performed as expected in the regression.
The coefficients of four variables - PMEs, PSICs, SIZEs and URs - turn out to be significant at the
5% level, and their coefficients have the appropriate signs as determined by the theories outlined in
Chapter Two and Chapter Three. It appears that the size of manufacturing's share of state
employment, and the share of manufacturing employment held by the seven most polluting
industries, both have negative effects on participation rates. This supports the bargaining power
theory posited by Segerson and Miceli as applied to the case of the 33/50 Program. After scaling
the coefficients to account for differences in the magnitude of the numbers by multiplying the
coefficient on PMEs , one can see that a unit change in the percentage of total employment made up
of manufacturing employment has a bigger per-unit effect on participation rates that the percent of
manufacturing employment made up of the seven dirtiest industries. 36
Two variables, SIZEs and UR s, both have positive and significant impacts on participant
rates at the 5% level. These results are consistent with the economic literature: bigger firms, or
more precisely states with larger average manufacturing facility sizes, are often found to be
significantly more likely to voluntarily reduce their harmful environmental impacts in theoretical
and empirical models. And, rather than discouraging the adoption of environmental initiatives in
manufacturing, high unemployment rates contribute to high Program participation rates. Scaling
the coefficients by dividing the coefficient on URs by 1,000 reveals that, other factors held constant,
average firm size has a larger impact on participation rates than the unemployment rate does.
The variable representing the rate of membership in the Sierra Club, SCMs , has at-statistic
of approximately 1.89, which makes the variable significant at the 10% level. The coefficient of

SCMs has the sign predicted by the theoretical argument: citizens' environmental vigilance is a
significant motivator for firms. Given the body of theoretical and empirical work which emphasizes
the importance of community goodwill, and the potential power of local activists proxied by SCMs ,
it's somewhat surprising that the SCMs variable is not more strongly significant. Perhaps other
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proxies for private environmental vigilance would yield different results. It would be interesting to
differentiate among the various forms of civic activism and to empirically determine which forms of
activism are the most effective. That is a topic for a different paper, though. The coefficient on
SCMs appears to be very large in the regression output, indicating very large changes in

participation rates for corresponding unit changes in the value of SCMs , but this is, again, a result of
the fact that the data, measured as Sierra Club membership over state population, have very small
values. If the coefficient is scaled to that of A VRs , another proxy for political attentiveness, the
coefficient on SCMs would actually have a coefficient of just .1903.
Three other variables, A VR s, CEVs and IMECs , prove to be insignificant to the model, but
nonetheless have the signs predicted by the aforementioned theoretical arguments. The most
intriguing outcomes of the regression are certainly those pertaining to the proxies for the
bargaining power of the regulatory body and the legislative body of government, ASNCs and LCVs .
These results will be discussed in tum.

f

I

The ASNCs variable was described in Chapter Two as a proxy for the level of mandatory
regulatory threat that the facilities invited to join the 33/50 Program would have felt when making

I

!
I
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their participation decisions, as it represents the average number of addressed episodes of
significant non-compliance with existing toxic chemical regulations. The theoretical model of the
relative bargaining powers of a regulatory body and an industry put forth by Segerson and Miceli
concludes that voluntary participation in an environmental program will become more likely as the
bargaining power of the regulatory body increases, and less likely as it decreases in relation to a
firm's bargaining power. By this logic, the higher the average level of addressed significant noncompliance with existing regulation was in a state, the higher the participation rate of firms in that
state should have been. The empirical evidence gives the opposite conclusion, though: the stricter
the enforcement of EPA toxics regulations in a state, the less likely were firms to participate in the
Program.
One possible explanation for this outcome is th~t~nforcement could be correlated with
,',"

'

... .. .

some understood agreemerit between the EPA arid firms whereby the EPA agrees to cut firms some
regulatory slack in return for the firms agreeing to join the 33/50 Program. If this were the case,
then participation rates would increase as enforcement decreases, as they do in the model's
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regression. Arora and Cason considered this possibility of preferential treatment for voluntarily
participating firms, and compared the list of participating Program companies to the list of
companies that had been penalized under the Toxic Substances and Control Act (TSCA). They
fmd that eight out of 23 (35 percent) of the companies penalized under TSCA were enrolled in the
33/50 Program, and that the finn with the largest TSCA fine ($17 million), Chevron, was a full

participant in the Program. They mention another Program participant that was cited $4.8 million
in TSCA fmes. Arora and Cason conclude that Program participation does not, in fact, free a
company from regulatory obligations (Arora & Cason: 1995,273).
Arora and Cason's anecdotal evidence seems to disprove the hypothesis that firms and the
EPA trade participation in the 33/50 Program for less stringent enforcement of mandatory
environmental health and safety legislation. Alternative models of enforcement and compliance,
however, present strong theoretical evidence that a regulatory body may "make a deal" with a
polluter in one context to increase the aggregate level of compliance over a variety of environmental
programs and polluters (Heyes & Rickman: 1998; Amacher & Malik: 1996). Economists
Anthony Heyes and Neil Rickman propose a theoretical model in which the regulator is tolerant of
"
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Ii
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noncompliance at some times and with some firms in order to bring about higher levels of
comQliance at other times and with other regulated firms (Heyes & Rickman: 1998). Their theory
is an attempt to explain why firms are compliant with regulation a significant portion of the time
even though the EPA rarely pursues violators and the expected penalty for noncompliance is
usually less costly than the equipment needed to actually achieve compliance. They theoretically
test the hypothesis that the EPA uses a strategy of selective penalizing to maximize aggregate,
steady-state compliance over firms in a number of enforcement areas, i.e., over a set of laws
regulating the use and disposal of different types of pollution over a variety of media (air,
groundwater, etc.). Heyes and Rickman conclude that "regulatory dealing," as they call it, can in
fact, "buy" the compliance of a large portion of the regulated population by penalizing a select few
companies in a subset of regulatory spheres (Heyes & Rickman: 1998,373).
Their results suggest that the EPA's failure to address a large percentage of regulatory
violations in some states may not be evidence of lax enforcement, but rather evidence of strategic
enforcement. This possibility calls into question the validity of Segerson and Miceli's bargaining
power theory, since one could infer from Heyesand Rickman's conclusion that the the EPA
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actually conserves its bargaining power through strategic, selective penalization rather than flex all
of its regulatory muscle at once. This could explain why higher rates of ASNCs are shown to
reduce participation in the 33/50 Program. The EPA enforcement activities in those states may not
have been coordinated enough to utilize a system of "strategic tolerance of non-compliance," a
situation which, if Reyes and Rickman's model translates to reality, would have reduced overall
compliance (including voluntary compliance, perhaps) with toxics regulation among industries
(Reyes & Rickman: 1998,366).
If the EPA does in fact derive its ability to threaten fInns from its ability to selectively

pursue non-compliance, then its ability to have sway over companies diminishes every time an
enforcement action takes place. Evidence in support of this hypothesis can be found in Figure One
below, which illustrates the statistical relationship between the EPA's level of enforcement of
existing toxic regulations (ASNCs) and Program participation rates. The data used in the chart
come from ordering the 51 observations for ASNCs andPRs in ascending order of participation
rates, and then dividing the observations into three groups of 17. The average ASNCs and PRs for
the each section are the six points that make up the two lines; each group average appears next to
the appropriate point in Figure One. While the relationship is not perfectly linear, there is a
consistent inverse relationship between ASNCs and PRs.
Figure One: Potential Loss of EPA Bargaining Power
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This trend can also be seen, although not as clearly, in Figure Three. There is no way of
knowing, given the data available, whether lower rates of addressed SNCs occur because of
strategic bargaining or because of, for example, tight budgets that do not allow for much pursuit of
violators. If SNCs were not addressed because of budget problems, though, fIrms may not have
perceived the same threat level as if SNCs remained unaddressed because the EPA was conserving
its bargaining power. If it can be assumed that lower values for ASNCs occur when the EPA
operation in that state is conserving its bargaining power to engage in strategic bargaining, then the
empirical results could have some interesting interpretations. If the assumption holds, then the
relationship between EPA enforcement rates and 33/50 Program participation rates provides some
empirical evidence for the theoretical hypothesis that cooperative, strategic regulatory bargaining
yields higher voluntary participation rates in environmental programs than simply strict
enforcement. This is an area of study that deserves more empirical testing.
This bargaining game suggests that cooperative game theory could be used to explain or at
least investigate the EPA's enforcement strategies. Gregory S. Amacher and Arun S. Malik do, in
fact, present a theoretical model in which the environmental regulatory body and the regulated fIrm
employ a Nash bargaining game to engage in what Heyes and Rickman call "regulatory
bargaining'.? (Amacher & Malik: 1996). According to Amacher and-Malik, in a two-party,
cooperative Nash bargaining game, both parties will be better off if the regulator has the same
objectives as society (Le., wants to reduce the social costs of pollution) and if both parties cooperate
when making their decisions. The model proposed by Amacher and Malik is, like Heyes and
Rickman's model, in opposition to the traditional model of regulatory standard-setting, enforcement
and compliance in which the regulator dictates standards to the polluter and the polluter follows the
standards. The traditional model is what Segerson and Miceli ·seem to have in mind when
presenting their bargaining power theory, and, unlike the Nash model, is a non-cooperative model in
which the regulator leads and the fIrm follows, or vice-versa, depending on which party has more
bargaining power.
Amacher and Malik also consider the fact thai'lliird parties can become involved in the
bargaining process and affect the outcome, and incorporate this consideration into their model. A
third party that has a fairly passive impact on the way a regulator weighs a firm's costs of
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mitigation, for example, can be introduced into their model, or the authors can incorporate a third
party that makes strict and unwavering demands, like an environmental lobbying group that refuses
to accept anything less than the cleanest possible technology (Amacher & Malik: 1996,250 - 251).
Amacher and Malik do not state the effect that strong environmental or industrial lobbying would
have on the outcome of their model, but they do state that third parties do, in fact, attempt to
influence the pure two-party bargaining game.
Heyes and Rickman also test a variation of their model in which private individuals and
environmental interest groups are allowed to fIle citizen suits against non-compliant facilities if the
government fails to enforce regulations. Obviously, citizen suits might throw a cog in the gears of
any regulatory body's strategic enforcement scheme, if such schemes exist. Their model suggests
that, predictably, the threat of being sued by a non-governmental body reduces the value that an
EPA "bribe" will have for a ftrm, since the violating firm may be judicially regulated by citizens
even if its discretions are strategically ignored by the EPA (Heyes & Rickman: 1998, 370). The
importance of their theoretical outcome to the empirical model of voluntary participation in the
33/50 Program presented in this paper is ambiguous, though, because high rates of Sierra Club
membership (SCMs ) - which proxies for the level of citizens' bargaining power in environmental
regulatory decision making - are shown to increase the rate of Program participation at the 10%
level cif signillcance, rather than lower the aggregate level of compliancel participation, as the
Heyes-Rickman model suggests would occur. This calls into question whether citizens suits and
an environmentally active population are substitutes for EPA enforcement and standards, or
complements. Does private activism have an independent positive effect on Program participation
rates in states with uncoordinated EPAs, or do the two variables interact in some way? Answering
this question is important for further interpretation of the ASNCs and SCMs coefficient estimations,
and an analysis of the problem is presented below.
Perhaps ASNCs and SCMs are not actually independent of one another; if they are
substitutes, then an inactive EPA might motivate the public to become more environmentally
vigilant, or maybe an active EPA makes the public less-ittentive to environmental problems. If the
two variables are complements, then the two "regulators," one citizen-led and one EPA-led, either
spur each other on or share a loose approach to enforcement. Heyes and Rickman do not propose
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which relationship occurs more often, or to what effect, but they do comment on the potential for
there to be a consistent complement or substitute relationship between the two forces (Heyes and
Rickman: 1998,371).
In an attempt to investigate the possible positive or negative correlations between public and

private environmental vigilance, the state-by-state data for SCMs and ASNCs can be compared; the
results of this comparison are in Figure Two below. If public and private concern and enforcement
are substitutes, then SCMs should be high whenASNCs is low, and vice-versa. If they are
complements, then the two variables should travel together. The values used to plot SCMs are
scaled to make the graph more readable (the SCMs values used in the empirical model are
multiplied by 100 for use in Figure Two).
The picture in Figure Two suggests that public and private environmental vigilance act as
both substitutes and complements in the 50 states and the District of Columbia, if existing
substitute/ complement relationships are anything more than statistical coincidence. According to
the graph, ASNCs and SCMs act as substitutes in 31 instances (61 percent) and complements in 20
instances (39 percent). There is no geographical pattern to the substitute/ complement relationship
between the two variables.

I

Figure Two: ASNCs and SCMs
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The ASNCs and SCMs variables can also be mathematically tested for interaction. The
regression output below allows for the possibility of an interaction between regulatory and citizen-

:l

led pressure on polluters. According to the output, the possible interaction between ASNCs and

SCMs is not significant to this model.

and
he

Summary Statistics

lent

Interaction Test Model

ASNCs

-0.107177
(0.071319)
6.325905
(10.81921)
37.42257
(88.06068)

SCMs
tS

ASNCs*SCMs
.... ,'

to

120

More important than pinning down the relationship between the two sources of potential
regulatory threat, though, is figuring out whether one type of relationship is more desirable than the

;hip

other, i.e., whether a complementary relationship is associated with higher participation rates, or
vice-versa. To test whether the nature of the relationship between ASNCs and SCMs bas anything
to do with 33/50 Program participation rates, Figure Three plots those two variables with
participation rates in ascending order. It appears that the relationship between public and private
environmental vigilance has no relationship to state-level Program participation rates. It is not as
though the states with a complementary ASNCsI SCMs relationship are all states with lower
participation rates, or vice versa. Heyes and Rickman might be correct, then, in failing to draw
conclusions about the effect that the relationship between public and private enforcement has on
firms' compliance decisions. This is a topic that would benefit from further empirical study. If
there is some interaction between the EPA's level of vigilance and that of citizen groups like the
Sierra Club, then perhaps that interaction could be expIQi!~cl to increase polluters' compliance rates
and reduce the social costs of monitoring, enforcement and abatement. It might be interesting to
look at possible cause-and-effect links between socioeconomic variables and the relationship
between public and private enforcement tendencies. Any lessons that could be drawn regarding a
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clear trend would be useful in designing public policy and, in particular, regulatory strategies. The
empirical model does indicate, though, that the EPA's actions have more consistent impacts on
Program participation rates than do the active membership rolls of environmental citizens' groups,
as ASNCs is sigmficant below the 5% level, and SCMs is significant below the 10% level.

I

Figure Three: PRs, ASNCs and SCMs
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Amacher and Malik's paper, like Heyes and Rickman's, implies that ASNCs may not be an
appropriate proxy for the bargaining power of the regulator, since the rate at which known
violations are pursued may not accurately reflect the political might of the regulatory body. Both of
these papers suggest that low levels of enforcement in one area of regulations might actually be
used as leverage - bargaining power - to increase compliance in other areas. Perhaps the three EPA
programs chosen for the ASNCs variable, EPCRA, TSCA and RCRA, are the standards
"sacrificed" by the EPA in order to bribe firms into complying with other programs. If this is the
case, then large values for ASNCs could signal a state in which the EPA does not bargain with
regulated firms, and finns can therefore not be induced to voluntarily participate in the 33/50
Program. Again, this paper and model would benefit from further theoretical and empirical
investigation into the relationship between enforcement of existing toxic waste mitigation programs
and voluntary participation in an additional program, like the 33/50 Program, as well as possible
strategies.used by regulators.
The other curious outcome of this regression involves LCVs , the variable that proxies the
"greenness," or level of environmental consideration, of a state's delegation to Congress.
Segerson and Miceli's bargaining power theory concludes that higher levels of perceived threat of
mandatory regulation spur companies to voluntarily reduce emissions because compliance-with
mandatory abatement regulation is always more expensive than achieving the same levels of
abatement voluntarily. Their model assumes that transaction (and enforcement) costs of mandatory
compliance are always higher than those of voluntary abatement; this is a commonly accepted
theory (Segerson & Miceli: 1998; Wu & Babcock: 1999; Khanna: 2001). Thus, it seems safe to
presume that, the higher the rate with which a state's elected members of Congress vote in favor of
protecting the environment, the higher the perceived threat of future mandatory legislation and the
Program participation rate will be. The empirical results show that the opposite is true: the more
often a state's u.s. senators and representatives vote in favor of environmental protection, the less
likely firms within that state will be to voluntarily join the Program. If the League of Conservation
Voters rating of Congress is in fact an accurate proxy f6~'ih~eenvironmental leanings of elected
representatives, then the only possible explanation seems to be that the greenness of a state's
Congressional delegation does not pose a threat to the state's manufacturing industries.
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Perhaps this is true, that the link between federal government and environmental regulatory
threat on the state level is not very strong. If this were the case but Segerson and Miceli's theory of
regulatory threat remained true, though, the coefficient on LCVs would have been insignificant, but
positive. Instead, the coefficient is negative and significant. This suggests that passing formal,
binding environmental legislation actually discourages participation in voluntary environmental
programs. There is no available literature on the effect that the passage of new, mandatory
environmental legislation has on participation in related voluntary programs, but one might
hypothesize, in accordance with Heyes and Rickman's theory, that imposing new legislation
removes some of the bargaining power held by the public regulatory body. If passing mandatory
legislation is, in effect, making good on old regulatory threats, then passage would relieve some of
the threat of legislation perceived by finns and thereby reduce the relative bargaining power of
government. If, for example, a father threatens to make his daughter clean her room if she doesn't
stop bothering her brother and ends up making her clean her room for another reason, then the
daughter no longer has any incentive to stop pestering her brother. Similarly, a regulation that has
been passed into law can no longer be held over polluters' heads as a potential threat. Figure Four
illustrates the average trend in participation rates versus the "greenness" of government, or proxied
level of legislative threat.
;i

Figure Four: Potential Loss of Legislative Bargaining Power
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While the negative relationship between PRs and LCVs is not as pronounced in Figure Four
as the relationship between PRs andASNCs in Figure One, the empirical evidence does support the
theory that Congress can bring about higher voluntary participation rates if it conserves some of its
legislative bargaining power. This is another intriguing area of further analysis that would benefit
the interpretation of this model's empirical results.

Empirical Conclusions

The results regarding public and private bargaining power, both the unexpected effects of

ASNCs and LCVs on participation rates and the as-expected signs of the coefficient estimations of
the variables proxying industry bargaining power (PMEs and PSICs ), are interesting because they
complicate some aspects of the model's theoretical foundation. Segerson and Miceli's theory of
bargaining power that does not allow for cooperative, strategic bargaining is called into question by
the fact that states with seemingly more pro-environment legislators and regulators have lower
Program participation rates than seemingly less eco-oriented enforcement and legislative threats, all
other factors held constant. These results, coupled with the theoretical models of strategic
regulatory enforcement, suggest that ~ooperative bargaining between the regulator and the regulated
has a positive effect on participation rates in the 33/50 Program and, possibly, other voluntary
programs. Moreover, the negative coefficients on ASNCs and LCVs lend credence to a bargaining
theory in which the regulator and the legislative body hold on to their enforcement and mandatory
regulatory chips, as it were, in order to gain an advantage at the compliance! voluntary participation
bargaining table. The data on enforcement vs. participation rates in Figure One and legislative
"greenness" vs. participation rates in Figure Four provide cursory visual evidence of this theory in
action in the real world. Private environmental interest groups and candidates for elective office
often tout the benefits of a regulatory body that is not willing to make deals with polluters. This
may sound like a good idea from a rhetorical and political standpoint, but if it results in less-thanmaximal compliance rates and higher overall costs to society, is it really in the best interests of the
public? Maybe not, the alternative strategic bargaining theory suggests.
More empirical research needs to be done to identify incidences of environmental
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regulatory bargaining in the real world, and to test the effects of such bargaining on total steady
compliance rates, pollution abatements and social costs. In particular, further research might
expose a low point of enforcement past whlch the regulator ceases to be a threat because it never or
very rarely enforces any laws or pursues any cases of non-compliance. On the flip side, further
investigation might also illuminate a high point of enforcement past which fIrms will begin to have
higher participation rates as the enforcement level increases. This latter situation would
theoretically only occur if the fees or other costs of non-compliance were raised beyond the costs
of compliance for all fIrms.
It remains unclear whether or not there is a consistent relationship between regulatory

enforcement strategies and environmental vigilance and! or judicial action on behalf of citizens, and
how a possible relationship might affect voluntary participation rates. The empirical evidence
nonetheless shows that the rate of Sierra Club membership, as a proxy for citizens' environmental
vigilance, has an overall positive effect on Program participation, although its significance is not as
great as was expected. Again, the possibility that activists' and regulators' strategies for inducing
firms to comply with regulation is intriguing, and deserves further attention. If such a substitute or
complementary relationship is empirically proven to exist, then perhaps it could be used to bring
about high rates of voluntary action at low costs to society.
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Chapter Five
What Impact Does This Evidence Have on Climate Policy?

This paper began with a discussion of climate change, the nascent state of climate policy
and fInns' motivations for voluntarily reducing carbon dioxide emissions, but a lack of data on the
fIrms and emissions reduction credit trading (ERC) systems forced the empirical analysis to focus
on fmns' motivations for voluntary compliance in another area, that of toxic chemical use. The
empirical results can be used, though, to identify the "pressure points" that should be pushed in
order to make the greatest gains in voluntary compliance with GHG abatement programs and,
therefore, the greatest aggregate reductions in GHG emissions. The interpretation of the relevant
variables in the context of potential voluntary or mandatory climate policy is given below.
Some of the variables used in the empirical model are of little practical relevance to
bureaucrats and businesspeople who want to design voluntary GHG abatement policies. The
unemployment rate, for example, is not exactly a "pressure point" that can or should be exploited
to increase the rate of volunteerism. Politicians, no matter how environmentally conscious an
electorate they hope to represent, are unlikely to campaign on the basis of rising unemployment
rates and falling impacts on global warming. Moreover, climate change can be addressed without
pushing people out of their jobs. Similarly, macroeconomic factors like the index of the change in
manufacturing employment (IMECs ) are of limited use to policy makers. Changing a
macroeconomic variable like the size of the manufacturing industry within a state involves actually
moving those companies and jobs to other states or countries, and simply moving a factory to
somewhere else does not actually reduce global GHG emissions. Some pundits who profess to be
climate change authorities say that moving U.S. industry overseas not only lowers the cost of
goods to U.S. consumers, but also reduces U.S. contributions to climate change. While U.S. fIrms
would technically be belching out less pollution if industry was shipped overseas, such
commentators do not understand the systematic nature of the climate change issue. Even though
the emissions would not be produced on American

soil.)~ thegoods

would be made in factories in

developing countries, which tend to have lower pollution standards than the United States, and
shipped here in vehicles powered by fossil fuels. And, as was previously mentioned, eliminating
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u.s. jobs is usually not a selling point for any policy.
There are industrial factors which affect voluntary participation rates that can be utilized in
promoting voluntary emissions reductions, though. A company that is expanding its facilities, or a
new company that is setting up shop, may find itself well positioned to join a permit trading
program, as the positive result for the estimated coefficient on the manufacturing capital
expenditures over value of sales variable (CEVs ) indicates. While this variable is not found to be
significant in the model, it could become a significant driver of participation if new firms or firms
undertaking capital improvements were actively recruited to join trading programs. And, if a trading
program is used as part of mandatory GHG legislation, then firms buying new capital would have a
strong incentive to purchase the "cleanest" equipment possible, assuming the marginal cost of the
cleaner-running equipment is lower than the marginal cost of compliance, if it costs more at all. As
was stated in the theoretical section of the paper, though, the costs of non-compliance perceived by
polluters should go up as the threat of mandatory regulation increases, which would make the
additional expense of emissions-saving investments seem like less of a barrier.
The size of a company, according to this analysis and many others, is a contributing factor
to the participation decision. Policies that focus on bigger companies, at least initially, will have
higher rates of voluntary compliance. This happens for a number of reasons. For example, large
firms tend to have more funds earmarked for specialized projects and they often attract more publicI
stakeholder scrutiny (and praise, in the case of BP). In other words, large firms see greater net
benefits to participation than do small- and medium-sized firms. Large firms also tend to have
more funds on hand to finance non-essential projects than small- or medium-sized firms.
Promoting a voluntary abatement strategy among large firms might also make smaller firms take
notice and want to get on board, according to theories of corporate and industry leadership.
The original hypothesis of this paper states that voluntary participation can be motivated by
increasing the strength of the regulatory body's threat of mandatory legislation relative to the
industry's strength to resist such legislation. The counterintuitive empirical results, however, reveal
the presence of a more complicated system of threats~-efiforcement and industry power. If the
results given by the model are accurate, and if an EPA and Congress that are tough on polluters
represent regulatory bargaining power, then the last thing environmentalists would want is more

56

"bargaining power," since voluntary industry participation would decrease! The simpler theory of
bargaining power does not seem to produce the desired results in the real world.

It should be mentioned again that the theory advanced by Heyes and Rickman depends on,
among other things, the (accurate) assumption that the expected penalty for non-compliance that a
polluter faces is lower than the cost of compliance (Heyes & Rickman: 1999,362). This begs the
question: why not simply impose mandatory legislation for carbon dioxide emissions and set the
penalties for non-compliance higher than the costs of compliance? The answer is that politics
controls legislation in the United States, and the negative and strongly significant coefficients on the
variables for the manufacturing industry's regulatory/ political clout within a state (PMEs and

PSICs ) give evidence of the sway that polluters seem to have over public policy. Witness President
George Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney: since gaining office three years ago, the two have
often been accused of being beholden to fossil fuel interests and, 10 and behold, removing the
United States from the Kyoto treaty was one of the first things Bush did in office. While the

PMEs and PSICs variables are negatively correlated with Program participation rates at the one
percent level of significance, A VRs and SCMs are positively correlated with participation rates at the
10 percent level of significance: individual citizens have little power against big industrial interest
groups~- In-addition,

..

ASNCs and LCVs , vari~bles intended to prm~-y the regulatory and legislative

threat levels, have negative and strongly significant coefficients: the forces that are supposed to
impose limits on pollution are forced, in part because of penalties set lower than compliance costs,
to bargain with violators to achieve the highest possible level of compliance. The results of the
empirical model suggest that, at least in the case of toxics regulation, manufacturers hold the
majority of the bargaining power. The results and theory imply that regulators are forced to strike a
deal with regulatees, not the other way around.

It is highly likely that, in the context of the alternative and more complex bargaining theory
introduced in the empirical analysis, the ASNCs and LCVs variables turn out to have negative
impacts on Program participation rates because higher enforcement rates and higher pro::~:_7·F"·.:.~-· "e·

environment voting averages are actually representative of reduced governmental bargaining power,
not of legislative or regulatory threats of stricter pollution standards. Posing a threat to polluters is
still necessary, according to the model, but the threat that the EPA and Congress poses to polluters
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essentially comes from having their hands tied. The empirical results show that the EPA and
Congress will never be able to pose more than weak threats which, according to Segerson and
Miceli's paper, is a condition that will always yield low levels of pollution abatement (Segerson &
Miceli: 1998, 128). If the alternative theory of strategic bargaining holds true, then legislators who
want to see climate change policy enacted should not actually pass laws regulating emissions, just
propose them. Even if this strategy poses a threat to industry at ftrst, there is likely to be a point at

which the threat breaks down; this possibility needs to be investigated further. If legislators are
more concerned with retaining their bargaining power than setting the aggressive GHG emissions
reductions needed to mitigate the potential threat of climate change, then the ultimate crisis may not
be averted. Due to the nature of the problem and the short timeframe in which reductions on the
order of 70 percent below 1990 emissions levels must be made, the typical political strategy of
"muddling through" will not be enough to get the job done. 37
But what if Congress and the EPA - and the public - actually did represent serious
regulatory threats rather than minor players in one of the most important games that public policy
has ever had to play? The only way to change the roles of the players is to change the rules of the
game. Emissions permit trading plays the regulatory game from another angle: rather than raise the
price of the penalty, a well-designed trading system would simply lower the costs of compliance
until the beneftts of compliance outweigh the costs, and even turn some of those costs into beneftts
through the sale of excess permits. If politics is not going to address the problem of climate
change quickly and effectively, then market forces must be utilized to avoid potential catastrophe.
It might be productive to eliminate the entire concept of "bargaining power" in regulation

altogether and replace it with the notion of "market incentives." Rather than raise the penalty for
non-compliance, regulators should lower the total costs of compliance in a variety of ways while
maintaining ambitious abatement targets. Emissions trading provides an opportunity to change the
nature of pollution control by giving ftrms a flexible way to reduce aggregate emissions at marginal
costs lower than the costs of compliance with a command-and-control abatement program that has
comparable reduction targets (Wu & Babcock: 1999;' Segerson & Miceli: 1998). A voluntary
emissions trading program changes the very meaning of regulation because rather than imposing
rules and technology standards that must be followed to the letter, the organizer of a voluntary
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agreement simply sets an abatement goal and provides a framework in which participants can freely
buy and sell emissions reduction credits to achieve compliance with the target. Such a program
need not be voluntary, and it might in fact yield even more significant emissions reductions if the
abatement targets are supported by the law . .The EPA's Acid Rain Program, for example, has more
than achieved its goals, and firms have been actively trading in ERCs. Given the presence of the
inherently imbalanced and overly politicized power relationship between regulators and polluters,
perhaps the "stick" approach to regulation should be abandoned in favor of "carrots"; incentives,
rather than penalties, should be emphasized. Emissions trading is a policy model that uses carrots
before it uses sticks: firms can not only avoid penalties, but can also make money by reducing
emissions beyond the required level. The effectiveness of permit trading in terms of the volume of
GHGs abated depends on the structure of the program, the price of a permit and a number of other
factors that could fill a research paper of their own.
In conclusion, the bargaining that public officials and private firms engage in now can be
avoided, and significant reductions in greenhouse gas emission made, if the costs of compliance
with either a voluntary or a mandatory abatement target are brought to a point lower than the
benefits of participation in such a program. The results of the empirical model reveal that, currently,
having the "bargaining power" of the regulator outweigh the bargaining power of the regulatee
actually actually means strategic and incomplete enforcement of existing mandatory environmental
programs and passage of little, if any, new legislation. This is a game in which the regulator and, by
extension, the public, only wins by remaining beholden to polluters and their private cost functions.

If the fundamentals of this game can be changed so that the public and private interest work in
progressive unison, then rational, profit-maximizing firms would have no incentive not to reduce
their GHG emissions. By targeting the bigger firms first and encouraging those firms to lead their
respective industries; by providing incentives for companies to install cleaner and more energyefficient equipment when capital comes up for replacement; by encouraging firms to produce
products and services for environmentally minded consumers and communities; and by endorsing a
policy or program whereby those firms that go beyond;poglRliance can actually profit from their
efforts, policy makers can begin to construct an incentive framework to induce sizable voluntary
reductions in the emission of greenhouse gases.

59

ENDNOTES
I For a list of the companies that are participating in actual voluntary trades of carbon dioxide and carbon dioxide
equivalents, or of companies that are working to 'design selected trading systems, please consult the List of
Voluntary Participants in the Appendix.

International Emissions Trading Association official website. Full list of members and their regional
distributions, Online: <www.ieta.org> Nov. 12,2002.

2

3 For a complete listing of the countries and international governing bodies that have GHG abatement programs
registered with the International Emissions Trading Association, please consult the list of Countries and
International Government BodieslEngaged in Emissions Reductions in the Appendix.

4

C02e.com. "Market History." Available online: <www.C02e.comltrading>. Accessed 1119/02.

5 PriceWaterhouseCoopers. "Climate Change Strategic Services." PDF. Available online:
<www.co2e.comlstrategiesllists.asp?intcategoryid=:ll> Accessed 11116/02.

6

Please consult the Appendix for a list of the Founding Members of the Chicago Climate Exchange.

7

Please see Countries and International Governing Bodies Engaged in Emissions Reductions in the Appendix.

U.S Environmental Protection Agency. Clean Air Markets. Available online:
<www.epa.gov/airmarkets/cmprpt/arpollindex.html>.AccessedFeb.lS. 2003.

8

Frey: 2002; International Emissions Trading Association official website. lETA's Trading Scheme Database.
Online: <http://www.pointcarbon.comlschemes.php> Nov. 12,2002.

9

10 BP. Official website. Available online: <www.bp.comlenviron_social/case_studies/north_americalindex.asp>
Accessed Feb. 17,2003.

11 Taxpayers for Common Sense. Official website. Available online: <www.taxpayer.netlTCS/fuelsubfact.htm.
Accessed Feb. 17,2003.
12 For a list of the domestic GHG regulatory actions of foreign countries and international agencies, please see
Countries and International Governing Bodies Engaged in Emissions Reductions in the Appendix.

13

For a description of BP' s internal trading program, please consult BP's Internal Trading Program in the Appendix.

14 For a detailed description of BP's internal emissions reduction and permit trading programs, please consult BP's
Internal Trading Program in the Appendix.
IS Arora and Cason do not delve into whether poverty causes an area to be polluted or existing pollution causes an
area to be populated by poor people, but the general conclusion that high levels of pollution and wealthy
populations don't mix still holds true.

16 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "33/S0 Program: The Final Record." Office of Pollution Prevention and
Toxic. Ref. #: EPA-74S-R-99-004. March 1999. Available online:
<http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/33S0/33fin04.htm> Accessetl-l-'3-Nov. 2002.

17

Ibid.

18

Arora and Cason: 1995, 276.

Data Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance. "FY
1991 - FY 1996 State-by-State Enforcement Data Summaries." August 2000.

19

20 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency website. Enforcement Programs. Available online:
<www.epa.gov/compliance/civiVprograms/index.html> Accessed 12 Feb. 2003.
21 Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 1990 U.S. Census. Available online: <www.census.gov> Accessed 12 Jan.
2003 .
22 Data Source: League of Conservation Voters. 1989 - 1995 National Environmental Scorecards. Available online:
<www.lcv.orglscorecardlarchive.asp> Accessed 16 Nov. 2002.

Data Source: Sierra Club State-by-State Membership 1990 - 1996. Spreadsheet, obtained via e-mail from the
Sierra Club. Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. ST-99-3: "State Population Estimates: Annual Time Series, July
1, 1990 to July 1, 1999." Dec. 29, 1999. Available online: <eire.census.gov/popestlarchives/state/st-99-3.txt>
Accessed 15 Jan. 2003.

23

Data Source: Associated Press. "Political Inclination ofthe States." Jan. 9, 2003. Available online:
<www.boston.comldailynews/009/regionIPoliticaUnclination_oCthe_sP.shtml> Accessed 9 Jan. 2003.

24

2S Data Source: League of Conservation Voters. 1989 - 1995 National Environmental Scorecards. Available online:
<www.lcv.org/scorecard/archive.asp> Accessed 16 Nov. 2002.

26 Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 1990 U.S. Census. Available online: <www.census.gov> Accessed 12 Jan.
2003.

27 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "33/50 Program: The Final Record." Office of Pollution Prevention and
Toxic. Ref. #: EPA-745-R-99-004. March 1999. 4. Available online:
<http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/3350/33fin04.htm> Accessed 13 Nov. 2002.

28

Arora and Cason: 1995.

U.S. Census Bureau. 1995 Annual Survey of Manufactures: Geographic Area Statistics." April 1997. Available
online: <www.census.gov/prodl2lmanmin> Accessed 16 Jan. 2003.

29

30 For a complete description ofBP's internal GHG emissions trading program and program results, please consult
BP's Internal Trading Program in the Appendix to this paper.

Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 1995 Annual Survey of Manufactures: Geographic Area Statistics." April
1997. Available online: <www.census.gov/prodl2/manmin> Accessed 16 Jan. 2003.

31

U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment."
Available online: <data.bls.gov/cgi-binlsurveymost?gp> Accessed 18 Jan. 2003.

32

Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 1995 Annual Survey of Manufactures: Geographic Area Statistics." April
1997. Available online: <www.census.gov/prodl2/manmin> Accessed 16 Jan. 2003.

33

34

This restricted model is the final model that will be used for further analysis.

3S

From this point forward, the "old" restricted model, the model that omits the dummy variable PDUMs , will be

referred to as "the model," and its regression results used in the subsequent analysis. '
36 The data used in the model could have been scaled before running the regressions. However, the size of the
coefficients can be made more easily comparable without affeciitlg 'i nterpretations of significance by scaling the
coefficients in line with how the raw data could have been scaled.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that total GHG emissions levels must be reduced
by this amount in order avoid the detrimental effects of global climate change. The need for this quantity of
reductions stems primarily from the fact that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are persistent, and can stay
in the atmosphere and continue to heat the planet for up to hundreds of years (IPCC 2001; IPCC 2001b).
37

APPENDIX
Voluntary Private-Sector Participants: This list represents a nearly complete sampling of the
private, for-profit companies that are either helping to design a GHG emissions trading program,
are engaged in an existing trading system, or both. The companies are listed in alphabetical order,
and are paired with their associated trading program(s).
Key:

CCX = Chicago Climate Exchange (www.chicagoc1imatex.com)
C02e.com = C02e.com! Cantor Fitzgerald (www.C02e.com)
lETA = International Emissions Trading Association (www.ieta.org)
Pew Center =The Pew Center for Global Climate Change (www.pewclimate.org)

Firm
ABB
Air Products and Chemicals Inc.
Alcan
Alcoa
Alliant Energy Corp.
American Electric Power
Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.
Baker & Mackenzie Solicitors and Attorneys
Baxter
Boeing
BPI BP America
Cemex
CHZMHILL
Cinergy
CMS Generation Co.
C02e.com
Davies Ward Phillips & Vineburg LLP
DeBrauw Blackstone Westbroek
Det Norske Veritas (DNV)
Deutsche Borse
Deutsche Telecom
DTEI DTE Energy
DuPont! DuPont Canada
EmC Emission Control s.r.1.
Encana
Endesa Trading
Entergy
Enterprises pour l'Environment

. Ti"adina= Proa=rams! Association
Pew Center
Pew Center
lETA
Pew Center
CCX
CCX, IETA, Pew Center
lETA
IETA
Pew Center
Pew Center
CCX, C02e.com, IETA, Pew Center
CCX
Pew Center
CCX, Pew Center
CCX
IETA
IETA
IETA
IETA
IETA
Pew Center
CCX, Pew Center
CCX, C02e.com, IETA, Pew Center
IETA
IETA
IETA
Pew Center
IETA
,
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Firm

Tradinl: Programsl Association

Environmental Resources Management
Eskom
ESP
Evolution Markets
Exelon Corp.
First Energy Corp.
Ford Motor Company
Gaz de France
Georgia-Pacific
Grupo IMSA, SA de CV
Ho1cim
mM
Industrial Technology Research Institute
Innovation & Technology CenterlRoscorri
Intel
Interface Inc.
International Paper
John Hancock
KPMG
Lafarge
Lloyds Register
LockHeed Martin
Manitoba Hydro
Maytag
MeadWestvaco Corp.
Midwest Generation EME, LLC
Natsource
NiSource
Norsk Hydrol Norsk Hydro ASA
Norsk Hydro ASA
Novartis
Nuon
Ontario Power Generation
PG & E Corp.! National Energy Group
Pinnacle West Corp CAPS)
Point Carbon
PricewaterhouseCoopers

lETA
lETA
lETA
lETA
CCX
CCX
CCX, C02e.com
lETA
Pew Center
CCX
Pew Center
Pew Center
lETA
lETA
Pew Center
Pew Center
CCX
Pew Center
lETA
lETA
lETA
Pew Center
CCX
Pew Center
CCX
CCX
lETA
CCX
C02e.com, lETA
lETA
Pew Center
lETA
CCX, C02e.com, lETA, Pew Center
·eCX-,Pew Center
CCX
lETA
lETA
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Firm

Trading Programs! Association

PT. Indonesia Power
lETA
Rio Tinto
Pew Center
Rohm and Hass
Pew Center
Royal Dutch! Shell Group! Shell International C02e.com, lETA, Pew Center
SC Johnson
Pew Center
SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance SA
IEfA
ST Microelectronics, Inc.
CCX
Statoil
C02e.com, lETA
Stora Enso North America
CCX
. IEfA
Suddeutschland
Suncor Energy
CCX, C02e.com, lETA
Sunoco, Inc.
Pew Center
SwissRe
IEfA
Temple-Inland Forest Products Corp.
CCX
Texaco
C02e.com
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)
C02e.com, lETA
Tokyo Mitsubishi Securities
IEfA
TotalFina Elf
lETA
Toyota
Pew Center
Tractebel
lETA
TransAlta
lETA, Pew Center
TUV
lETA
TXU Energy Trading Co. LP
CCX
United Technologies
Pew Center
Unocal
IEfA
Waste Management Inc.
CCX
Weyerhaeuser
Pew Center
Whirlpool
Pew Center
Wisconsin Energy Corp.
CCX, Pew Center
Woodside Energy
lETA
Xlaunch
lETA
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Countries & International Governing Bodies En&aged in Emissions Reductions: This table
shows the countries and international agencies that are monitored by the International Emissions
Trading Association (lETA). This table also provides brief descriptions of the trading program(s)
that exist within each country and international governing body, as well as the program(s) planned
for the future. The infonnation is from the lETA database, which can be searched in more detail at:
http://www;pointcarbon.comlschemes.php?sysselect%5B%5D=1 &keywords%5B%5D=nature&submitbutton=Show+results. In most cases the program
descriptions are taken directly from the lETA's databases,while other have been paraphrased.
CoyntrII Internationol A2encI

Pro2ram/ Proposal Descriptions

Australia
Australia - New South Wales

Proposed national cap-and-trade system.
Emissions trading scheme building on an existing
emissions benchmarking program in connection
with electricity retailer licensing conditions.
Plan includes emissions trading for large
industrial emitters, increased invest in innovative
technologies and taxes.
The Pilot Emissions Reduction Trading Project
(PERT), now CleanAir Canada, is a self-funded
non-profit organisation allowing its members to
register and trade emission reductions through its
registry.
The Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Pilot
(GERT) is a voluntary partnership where
participants can register abatement projects and
trade carbon offsets. Projects are registed in
Canada's Climate Change Voluntary Challenge &
Registry.
.

Canada

Canada - CleanAir CanadaJ PERT

Canada - GERT

Czech Republic 11
Denmark
European Union

France

Germany

11 program initiated by the Czech Republic.
Domestic cap and trade scheme. Legal basis in
the C02 Quota Act passed in 2001.
Proposed community wide cap and trade system.
Note that this section builds on the current
proposal and that a final system, if approved,
could be subject to substantial changes.
Voluntary industry-government agreements.
Came about as an alternative to the broad-based
national energy tax (a previous energy tax
proposal was deemed unconstitutional by the
European Council in December 2000).
Voluntary agreements are preferred over a
trading approach. A 3-year pilot trading system
has been described in an issue paper written by a
. .goverflment-appointed working group on
emissions trading.
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Conntr!1 International Agenc!

Programl ProDosal DescriDtions

Japan

A trial system for trading of GHG emission rights
is planned for 2003. A voluntary GHG emissions
registry is also being planned.
Korea will establish a national greenhouse gas
emission registry system by 2004 and adopt an
international carbon dioxide emissions trading
(ET) system at a later stage.
Potential cross-border trading system proposed in
a working paper by an expert advisory board to
the Commission for Environmental Cooperation
(CEC) of North America. Industry roundtables
have also discussed trilateral trading schemes.
Proposal for national trading scheme. The
scheme resembles the proposed EU cap and trade
scheme, moving away from the first proposal by
the Dutch C02 Trading Commission (VogtHinder
Commissie).
An agreement between the Netherlands and CAF
to establish a facility that will purchase GHG
emission reduction credits.
The Certified Emission Reduction Units
Procurement Tender (CERUPT) is a CDM
procurement scheme where the Dutch
government purchases GHG emission reductions
in non-Annex 1 countries from companies from
all over the world.
The Emission Reduction Units Procurement
Tender (ERUPT)-isa JI procurement programme
where the Dutch government purchases GHG
emission reductions from companies from all
over the world. The scheme functions on a tender
basis with shortlisting.
An agreement between the Netherlands and the
mRD to establish a facility that will purchase
GHG emission reduction credits.
An agreement between the Netherlands and the
IFC to establish a facility that will purchase GHG
emission reduction credits.
Domestic cap and trade system.
Proposed domestic C02 emissions trading
system. To be fully compatible with the proposed
EU cap and trade scheme.
Proposal for a national trading scheme to replace
theJ;Q4. ,@x, which is planned to be phased out by
2005. Swedish climate change strategies dictate
that the system should be fully compatible with
the EU system.

Korea

NAFfA

Netherlands

Netherlands - CAF

Netherlands - CERUPT

Nertherlands - ERUPT

Netherlands -

mRD

Netherlands - IFC

Norway
Slovakia

Sweden
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L

Countrl'l International Agenc!

Programl Pronosal Descrintions

Switzerland

A voluntary system for C02 emissions
reductions.
National voluntary cap and trade.
Multipollutant legislation with cap and trade
system proposed by the Clean Power Group,
consisting of the companies NiSource, Calpine,
Trigen, and EI Paso. Enron used to be a member
of the group but is no longer on the membership
list.
A bipartisan bill introduced by senators Joe
Lieberman and John McCain in a U.S. Senate
hearing in January 2003. The bill proposes a
U.S. wide cap-and-trade system with an
accompanying national greenhouse gas database.
Multipollutant legislation setting emissions
standards for power plants. Draft regulations for
a market based approach are expected later in
2002.
The proposed New Hampshire Clean Power
Strategy, released in January 2001, places caps on
emissions from electricity generation.
The New Jersey Open Market Emissions Trading
(OMET) program and a GHG Trading Protocol
Project.
Oregon requires new power plants to meet CO2
emissions standards in order to receive site ·
certificates. Oregon established the Cliamte Trust
to implement C02 offset projects, which may be
used in future GHG regulatory or trading
systems.
The BioCF aims to deliver cost-effective
abatement and promote biodiversity conservation
and sustainable development by financing
demonstration sequestration projects in forest and
agro-ecosystems.
Multilateral initia~ive launched by the World
Bank in collaboration with the lETA. The fund
will provide finance for reducing GHG emissions
to small-scale projects in small developing
countries and rural areas of all developing
countries.
Multilateral initiative for project financing
intending to generate high quality emission
];~~tipns from CDMlJI. The system operates
under a closed-end mutual fund structure.

United Kingdom
USA - Clean Power Group

USA - Climate Stewardship Act of 2003

USA - Massachusetts

USA - New Hampshire

USA - New Jersey

USA - Oregon

World Bank - BioCF

World Bank - CDCF

World Bank - PCF
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Foumlinl: Members of the Chical:o Climate Exchanl:e: This table lists the fourteen founding
members of the Chicago Climate Exchange. The founders were announced in January of 2003.
These 14 companies, and the City of Chicago, have agreed to reduce their GHG emissions 1
percent below baseline in 2003, 2 percent in 2004, 3 percent in 2005 and 4 percent below baseline
in 2006. The baseline is set as the average of annual emissions from 1998 through 2001 for each
participant. (www.chicagoclimatex.com)

Foundinl: Members of the CCX
American Electric Power (AEP)
. Baxter International Inc.
City of Chicago
DuPont
Equity Office Properties Trust
Ford Motor Company
International Paper
Manitoba Hydro
MeadWestvaco Corporation
Motorola, Inc.
STMicroelectronics
Stora Enso North America
Temple-Inland Inc.
Waste Management, Inc.

BP's Internal Tradin2 Pr0l:ram'
In 1998, BP Chairman and CEO Lord John Browne committed the company to reductions
in "direct equity share" GHG emissions to 10 percent below the 1990 level. "Direct equity
share" emissions are all of the GHG emissions produced by facilities BP owns completely plus the
percent of emissions produced by partially BP-owned facilities, in proportion to BP's percentage of
interest in these facilities. The 1990 baseline was 90.1 million tons (revised for the December 31,
1998 merger with Amoco, which increased the baseline number of emissions), and in 2001 BP
reported emissions totaling 80.5 million tons, a reduction of 9.6 million tons, or 10.6 percent less
.~. "-? ''''' ~' . ;'''..;;:. .

than 1990 levels. Their reductions have been corroborated by outside auditors. BP also charged
1 Information for this section of the Appendix comes from: BP Official Website. Climate _
Change: Our
Performance. Available online:
<www.bp.comlenviron_sociallenvironmentlclimate_change/our_performance/index.asp> Accessed Feb. 19, 2003.
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itself with reducing 2001 GHG emissions by 2 percent over the course of the year, and was more
than successful. The company estimates that, on a net-pre sent-value basis over eight years, the fuel
designed out of operating processes is worth about $650 million.
BP achieved these impressive reductions using three main strategies: operational reduction,
investment in capital projects and an internal ERC trading system. Figure One below, "greenhouse
gas emissions reductions," shows where operational reductions were obtained in 2001. BP's ERC
trading system links every BP operational site in the world through an internal website on which
carbon dioxide credits are bought and sold among the different facilities. The year the trading
program began, in 2000,2.7 million tons of carbon dioxide were traded at an average price of $7.60
per ton. In 2001, 4.55 million tons of carbon were traded, and the average price was over four times
higher than it was in 2000, and stood at $39.63 per ton. Per-ton prices in 2001 were volatile, too,
ranging from $7 in January to $99 in September. Figure Two below, "carbon dioxide equivalent
vintage: 2001 traded prices" charts the internal selling price of a ton of carbon dioxide over the
course of 2001. Analysts at BP have concluded that the higher prices reflected stricter abatement
targets set for 2001, which caused shortages of sellers at a few points during the year. The analysts
also believe that those market conditions were caused in part by inaccurate forecasting of year-end
abatement positions. BP plans to continue to operate its internal trading system as a teaching tool,
and to plan additional internal and external emissions trading schemes.2

2

Ibid.
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Figure One3

greenhouse gas emissions reductions
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Chart copied from: BP Official Website. ClImate Change: Our Performance. Available online:
<www.bp.com!environ_sociallenvironmentlclimate_change/oucperformancelindex.asp> Accessed Feb. 19, 2003.
4 Ibid.
3
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